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I. INTRODUCTION
Elected judges are biased.  Biased in favor of campaign contribu-
tors, in-state litigants, and parties (and causes) popular with the
state’s electorate.  Not every judge is biased, of course, and certainly
not in every case, but often enough to make systemic judicial bias one
of the biggest threats to the legitimacy of the American justice system
and the rule of law.1  Despite its growing magnitude,2 the problem has
proven intractable.  It is not for lack of trying; proponents of judicial
impartiality3 have long recognized these bias concerns and have
struggled to discover solutions.
This Article offers what is at once a novel and an originalist ap-
proach by reimagining an institution with a rich historical pedigree
and one that the Founders believed should (and would) redress judi-
cial bias in civil litigation: the civil trial jury.  But the civil jury as we
have come to know it is powerless and largely obsolete because, in
modern civil litigation, judges alone decide most cases—at least the
ones that don’t settle—long before they reach the jury, and sometimes,
as with post-verdict judgment as a matter of law or remittitur of dam-
ages, even after the jury has acted.  Their tools of choice are the mo-
tion to dismiss, the motion for summary judgment, and the motion for
judgment as a matter of law.  These procedural mechanisms, which
did not exist at common law or at the time of the founding, have made
civil jury trials exceedingly rare.  Pretrial disputes and motion prac-
tice are the most important phases of modern litigation.4  I argue that
the people themselves, serving alongside elected judges on what I call
Hybrid Judicial Panels (or Hybrid Panels), can act as a direct check on
biased elected judges.  These Panels would consist of a (professional)
1. If this assertion sounds hyperbolic, consider that state judges handle approxi-
mately 98% of all civil litigation in the United States, including cases involving
federal constitutional and statutory issues.  Marc Galanter, A World Without Tri-
als?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 9.  And more than 80% of those state judges are
elected.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
43, 53 (2003).  If it is indeed true that judicial elections often (or even sometimes)
lead to judicial bias, then it is hard to imagine a bigger threat facing our legal
system, a system that presupposes that cases will be tried to an impartial arbiter.
See Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33
CONN. L. REV. 243, 252 (2000) (“One of the central tenets of the adversary system
is that the judge remain impartial.”).
2. In fact, as discussed in greater detail in Part II, infra, the problem continues to
worsen as judicial elections continue to evolve in ways that accentuate the bias
concerns.
3. These proponents include groups and individuals as diverse as the American Bar
Association, law professors, public interest organizations, and even elected (and
unelected) judges themselves.
4. Jeremiah L. Hart, Supervising Discretion: An Interest-Based Proposal for Ex-
panded Writ Review of § 1404(a) Transfer of Venue Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 139,
141 (2011) (“The pre-trial disputes at the center of these early choices dominate
modern litigation because few civil cases are tried”).
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judge and a small number of jurors (or lay judges),5 and would decide
determinative motions that are now decided by judges alone.6  The
judge and the jurors would work together to decide these dispositive
motions, most importantly the motion for summary judgment, remov-
ing a biased judge’s opportunity to rule in favor of a campaign contrib-
utor or against an unpopular litigant on her own.
The concerns that this Article identifies are hardly new.  For many
years, relying on a combination of anecdotal evidence and common
sense, critics of judicial elections have suspected that elected judges
may be biased.7  But for much of American history, empirical evidence
unequivocally proving the existence of such bias was lacking.  In re-
cent years, that has changed.  We now have plenty of data, in both the
civil and the criminal contexts, showing that elected judges are biased
in favor of those interests that helped them win their previous elec-
tion(s) and those that can help them win their future ones.
But if concerns about election-related judicial bias are nothing
new, why haven’t we solved them?  Scores of articles have been writ-
ten discussing these problems, with one scholar even suggesting that
the topic of judicial selection is the most written-about topic in all of
law.8  The difficulty lies in the fact that if we accept the proposition
5. In Part IV, infra, I briefly discuss how such jurors might be chosen.  However,
this Article merely introduces the idea of the Hybrid Panel.  Further research
and study would be required on the best way to implement the proposal and work
out further specific details.
6. Although the focus of this Article is the civil jury, a similar approach could be
used to redress judicial bias in the criminal context.  In particular, similar hybrid
panels could be used during the sentencing phase of a criminal matter to ensure
that judicial bias does not influence the punishment an elected judge imposes on
a criminal defendant.  For evidence of such bias in criminal sentencing, see notes
81–85, infra.
7. There is an open question in academic literature whether any judge can be truly
impartial, and even on the meaning of impartiality.  Every judge is influenced by
a number of factors, including his upbringing, personal characteristics, exper-
iences, etc. See Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Everything You Always Wanted to
Know About Judges but Were Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 346 (1998) (“Eve-
ryone, including every judge, is a conglomerate enterprise whose values and judg-
ments derive from a mysterious jumble of experiences since childhood.”).  For the
purpose of this Article, I only focus on the kinds of biases that everyone agrees
are improper and should not be a part of judicial decision-making: specifically, a
preference for a particular party because a ruling in favor of that party is likely to
help the judge retain his job. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 775 (2002) (“One meaning of ‘impartiality’ in the judicial context—and of
course its root meaning—is the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding.” (emphasis omitted)).
8. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges:
The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 31 (1986) (“Although
surely no one has made a formal count, it is fairly certain that no single subject
has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications over
the past fifty years as the subject of judicial selection.”).  Although I am not famil-
iar with any empirical studies assessing this claim, it is undoubtedly true that
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that elected judges are biased, then we must answer the obvious fol-
low-up question: Who will stop them? So far, that question has gone
unanswered.
The most obvious solution—doing away with judicial elections alto-
gether—is also the most untenable.  Despite all their warts, judicial
elections are supported by an overwhelming majority of the public.9
Similarly unrealistic is the prospect of electoral reform specifically tai-
lored for judicial elections.  Scholars have proposed a number of such
solutions, including public financing of judicial elections, contribution
and expenditure caps, and close monitoring and regulation of judicial
campaign conduct.  But recent Supreme Court decisions have made it
clear that judicial elections largely play by the same First Amendment
rules as all other elections.10  And those rules favor freedom for poten-
tial litigants (and their lawyers) to give money to judicial candi-
dates,11 to spend money on judicial candidates,12 and to allow judicial
candidates to say what they want to say on the campaign trail.13  In
other words, the very factors that are most likely to lead to judicial
bias are the ones that, today, receive the greatest First Amendment
protection.  Eliminating the corrupting influence of money from judi-
cial elections is not only unlikely to gain political traction, but any
efforts to do so are almost certainly unconstitutional under current
Supreme Court doctrine.
As a result, states deal with election-related judicial bias the same
way they deal with all other types of judicial bias: by requiring the
biased judge to recuse herself from the case.  Some scholars have in-
deed touted recusal as the best solution to the biased judge problem.14
judicial selection processes, and judicial elections in particular, have received sig-
nificant scholarly and media attention.
9. Geyh, supra note 1 (explaining that 80% of the public favors selecting judges by
election).
10. See White, 536 U.S. 765. But see James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First
and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 727 (2011) (suggesting that the Court might be willing to recognize differ-
ent rules in the context of judicial elections); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S.
Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding Florida’s direct solicitation ban for judicial election
candidates).
11. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating aggre-
gate contribution limits as violating the First Amendment).
12. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the
First Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent expenditures by a non-
profit corporation).  The Court’s more recent decisions have suggested that First
Amendment protection applies to all independent expenditures, including those
of for-profit corporations and labor unions. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that a for-profit corporation’s religious lib-
erty is protected under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
13. White, 536 U.S. 765.
14. Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judici-
ary, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 671, 692 (2009) (arguing recusal is “the only effective
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Judges, too, have hinted that erecting more stringent recusal stan-
dards can alleviate election-related judicial bias.15  The focus on
recusal also dominates the judicial ethics rules.  The Model ABA Code
of Judicial Conduct, as well as the ethics codes in all fifty states, re-
quires judges to step aside not only when they are actually biased, but
also when their impartiality could reasonably be questioned.16  On pa-
per, at least, this strict standard requires that every biased judge, or
even one who appears to be biased, be replaced with an impartial col-
league.  And if recusal worked as intended, it would completely obvi-
ate the concerns raised by this Article.
But recusal does not work for election-related judicial bias.  One
reason may be that judges typically decide their own recusal motions
and have a disincentive to recuse precisely when recusal is most
needed.17  A judge who truly feels a debt of gratitude towards a former
contributor, or one who hopes to turn a current litigant into a future
contributor, is also the judge least likely to step aside.18  But more
importantly some judge—a judge—must hear the case, and every
elected judge must worry about his or her electoral prospects.  In other
words, while recusal is theoretically a workable solution to individual-
ized judicial bias, recusal fails to address the systemic problem of elec-
tion-related judicial bias.19
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part II sets out the problem.
After briefly discussing the history and evolution of judicial elec-
means to ensure the impartiality of elected judges”); David K. Stott, Zero-Sum
Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through Recusal Re-
form, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 482 (2009) (suggesting “recusal reform offers an
effective, constitutional means of solving” the judicial bias problem that results
from judicial elections).
15. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that rather than
prohibiting judges from announcing their views during electoral campaigns,
states could “adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires,
and censure judges who violate these standards”); see also Caperton v. A.T. Mas-
sey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that a West Virginia Court of Appeals
justice was required to recuse himself when an officer of one of the parties played
a major role in that justice’s election to the court).
16. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(a) (2010).
17. See Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135
(2015) (arguing the self-recusal procedure is unconstitutional).
18. These motions are properly understood as a dispute between the litigant and the
judge, so the adversarial process would require those two parties to present their
dispute to an impartial arbiter.  But it is highly unlikely that any state would
create such a process, as it is potentially very time-consuming. See id.
19. Recusal remains an adequate solution when a specific jurist has a personal bias
in favor or against a party that is not shared by his or her colleagues.  For exam-
ple, if the judge owns stock in one of the corporate litigants, or is related to the
lawyer arguing the case, the judge must recuse himself. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)
(2012).
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tions,20 Part II highlights the empirical evidence demonstrating that
the judicial bias concern is both real and serious.  That evidence over-
whelmingly shows that elected judges rule in favor of their contribu-
tors, in-state litigants, and the perceived political preferences of the
electorate, while routinely ruling against out-of-state parties and un-
popular litigants and causes.  Part II concludes by discussing the
failed efforts to solve the bias problem.
Part III examines the role that the jury could play, and was in-
tended to play, in checking biased judges.  I show that at the time of
the founding, the jury was the primary institution entrusted with en-
suring judicial impartiality and independence.  Jefferson, Madison,
Hamilton, and a long line of their Federalist supporters and Anti-Fed-
eralist opponents, all agreed about the importance of the jury and the
jury’s central role in protecting constitutional guarantees against un-
scrupulous judges.  The jury, more than any other institution, was to
protect the people from judicial bias and corruption.  Part III also of-
fers some reasons for why the jury was (and continues to be) the per-
fect institution for such a role, and how the jury was able to fulfill that
function at the time of the founding.
In Part IV, I argue that the jury can no longer serve that bias-
checking role.21  At the time of the founding, civil jury trials were com-
mon; today, they are virtually nonexistent.  What had once been a vi-
brant institution integral to the structure of America’s government
has become little more than afterthought.  Today, few can even imag-
ine the jury serving such an important judge-checking role.  In fact, of
the thousands of articles written on judicial elections, judicial imparti-
ality, and judicial independence, to my knowledge not a single scholar
has extensively examined the role that the people themselves might
play in checking judicial bias by elected state judges.
I conclude Part IV by offering a new approach.  Rather than simply
suggesting a return to an eighteenth-century division of labor between
judges and jurors, I argue that jurors (or lay judges) should sit on
Panels alongside elected judges to make key pretrial decisions that
judges make on their own.  This novel integration of the jury into the
pretrial procedure helps preserve the historical benefit of the jury by
allowing the people to act as a check on judicial bias, while at the
20. Because much has been written about judicial elections, this Part does not offer a
complete history or description.  Rather, I summarize the practice and offer a
history of judicial elections only as necessary to establish my major premise that
judicial elections hamper judicial impartiality.
21. As explained in greater detail in section IV.A, over the last century and a half the
jury’s power has waned as the number of jury trials has declined and as the jury’s
role in those trials has been limited.  At the same time, the jury has been sub-
jected to a number critiques challenging its competence, impartiality, and
efficiency.
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same time preserving the advantages associated with judicial exper-
tise and modern rules of civil procedure.
II. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE IMPARTIALITY
PROBLEM
An Article that begins by scandalously accusing judges of bias
must back up that assertion.  Therefore, after a brief description of the
history of judicial elections in section II.A, section II.B presents the
evidence of judicial bias, as well as some reasons why election-related
judicial bias is an increasing threat to the rule of law with each pass-
ing election cycle.  Then, in section II.C, I discuss our failed, recusal-
centered approach to judicial bias.
A. A (Brief) History of Judicial Elections
Although the specific mechanisms vary from state to state, and
sometimes even from one level of a state judiciary to another,22 most
state judges obtain, and retain, their seats on the bench through judi-
cial elections.23  Today, judges in thirty-nine states face the electorate
to stay in office.24  This accounts for approximately 80% of all trial
judges in the United States, and nearly 90% of our state judges.25  No
other nation on earth elects judges to the extent that we do.26  This is
especially true for lower-level trial judges—the judges that have the
most direct interaction with litigants—who are sometimes subject to
elections even when state supreme court justices are not.27
22. Some state constitutions, for example, provide for elections of lower court judges,
while opting to select their supreme court justices through gubernatorial appoint-
ment. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7.
23. There are three major kinds of elections: partisan, non-partisan, and retention.  A
rich body of literature has described, and critiqued, each of these methods. See
generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDI-
CIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (explaining different selection methodolo-
gies and the reasons each was adopted).
24. Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, with One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES (May
25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/K5EX-6AXY (citing data
from the National Center for State Courts).
25. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J.
1077, 1105 (2007).
26. In fact, only two other nations—Japan and Switzerland—have any judicial elec-
tions, but both elect a very small portion of the country’s judiciary. See Rachel
Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REV. 249, 258
(2011).
27. Compare AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, INITIAL SELECTION: TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J9L4-58P9 (discussing se-
lection methods for state trial court judges), with AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, INITIAL
SELECTION: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS (2013), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/CYU5-WKCW (discussing selection methods for state appellate
court judges).
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This was not always the case.  In the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries, most state judicial selection systems mirrored
their federal counterpart.  In fact, in the late-eighteenth century, no
state judges were elected to office.28  Rather, state judges were typi-
cally appointed by: (a) the governor, (b) the state legislature, or (c)
some combination of the two.29  Not only did the appointment mecha-
nism mirror the federal system, so did the retention mechanism.
State constitutions protected judges against political retaliation and
favoritism, and sought to preserve judicial independence.30  Nearly
every state offered judges the same tenure protections (i.e., life ten-
ure) as the Constitution provides federal judges.31
But in response to a financial crisis that devastated the states in
the middle of the nineteenth century and concerns about judicial cor-
ruption and politicization, most states abandoned their appointive
systems in favor of judicial elections.32  Some have argued that judi-
cial elections were part of the Jacksonian movement towards greater
populism.33  But historians have largely rejected that justification.34
Rather, the driving force behind judicial elections was the belief that
elected judges would be more independent—specifically, more inde-
28. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping
Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV.
839, 855 (2012).
29. Id. (describing the selection methods at the time of founding for all thirteen origi-
nal colonies).
30. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1016–17
(2001) (“[A]ll of the state constitutions provided some protection for judges
against political retaliation . . . .”).
31. In fact, the Federal Constitution was modeled in large part on the constitutions
created by the states in the years after America declared independence in 1776.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (analogizing the draft Fed-
eral Constitution to the New York state constitution); see also William F. Swin-
dler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence to the Constitution,
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 519 (1976) (“As finally drafted and ratified, the
judicial article of the Federal Constitution in many respects reflected the basic
features of the antecedent state instruments, though it also incorporated provi-
sions that varied significantly from the prior state models.”).
32. SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 10.
33. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 130 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
34. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 78; see also Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on
Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary,
1846–1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 353 (1983) (arguing that judicial elections were
intended to “improve judicial administration, to increase the prestige of the bench
and bar, to curtail partisan domination of judicial patronage, and to restore sepa-
ration of powers by curbing legislative excess”); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of
Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum
America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 224 (1993) (criticizing “early commentators
who disparaged the elective judiciary as the outgrowth of unthinking
Jacksonianism”).
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pendent of corrupt state legislatures.35  State judicial selection
throughout the nation was transformed during this era.  While almost
no state used judicial elections prior to the 1830s,36 by the time of the
Civil War twenty-four states had adopted partisan judicial elections.37
Concerns about judicial partisanship that grew out of these parti-
san judicial elections led to two major progressive reforms in the 20th
century.  First, many states moved away from partisan judicial elec-
tions to non-partisan elections.38  The reformers hoped that removing
the corrupting influence of party politics from the judiciary would,
again, make judges more independent—this time of party bosses.
Unfortunately, non-partisan elections exhibited many of the same
problems as their partisan predecessors.  Candidates in non-partisan
judicial elections came to be perceived as affiliated more closely with
one of the political parties.  To make matters worse, removing the
party cue from the little information voters already had about judicial
candidates left voters entirely uninformed about how to cast their bal-
lot.39  When the non-partisan experiment failed (in the eyes of the re-
formers), some states adopted a system of merit selection.  Also known
as the Missouri Plan, merit selection is essentially a hybrid mecha-
nism that allows a governor to appoint a judge from a short list cre-
ated by a panel of experts.  These panels usually include lawyers and
lay people, and are supposed to evaluate potential nominees based on
their merit.  The nominated judge serves a short term in office, and
then stands for a retention election.  Retention elections are unusual
because the judge does not run against another candidate.  Instead,
the voters decide whether to retain the judge for another term.40
35. SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 148–54.
36. A couple states experimented with elections for some judicial posts in the 1810s.
Id. at 60.
37. At least in theory, these judicial elections were much like any other partisan elec-
tion for government office. See Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judi-
cial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1421–25 (2001) (discussing potential
concerns about partisan judicial elections).  As discussed below, in practice, it was
not until recently that judicial elections began to resemble elections for other of-
fices.  Few scholars have defended partisan judicial elections. But see PHILIP L.
DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR AC-
COUNTABILITY (1980).
38. SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 167–73 (discussing the transition from partisan to
non-partisan judicial elections).
39. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1438 (2001) (“[P]artisan judicial elections indicate party affilia-
tion on the ballot, which may be a primary cue for many judicial election voters.”).
40. For a thorough discussion of the Missouri Plan, see Stephen J. Ware, The Mis-
souri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751 (2009).
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As a result of these changes, the states now have three different
electoral mechanisms: partisan elections, non-partisan elections, and
retention elections.41  All three, however, lead to concerns about bias.
B. Evidence of Bias
Are elected judges really biased?  A number of recent (and some
not-so-recent) studies provide a resounding answer to that question.
On the whole, these studies show that elected judges are biased in
favor of those interests that helped the judge get elected and can help
the judge be reelected (e.g., donors, contributors, in-state litigants)
and against the interests that have not and cannot (e.g., out-of-state
litigants, unpopular litigants).  As a result, certain favored interests,
including campaign contributors and donors, fare well, while certain
disfavored litigants, including criminal defendants, fare poorly under
a variety of metrics and across jurisdictions.
To any students of psychology or human nature, this should come
as no surprise.  To keep their jobs, judges need to win elections.  And
to win elections, judges need money—a lot of money.42  That money
often comes from those that are most likely to appear in front of the
judge as litigants or lawyers.  Keeping the sources of that money satis-
fied becomes a priority for any judge that wants to keep his job.  In
addition, at the risk of stating the obvious, to win elections judges
need votes.  Therefore, keeping the electorate satisfied is another pri-
ority for any judge. Those two constant needs—money and votes—
lead to significant problems.  Worse, they lead to significant bias.
1. Keeping the Contributors Happy
Let’s begin with the group that seems to benefit most from judicial
elections: campaign contributors.43  Studies show that judges over-
41. For the purposes of this Article, these differences are largely irrelevant.  All three
methods require judges to raise money for their reelection, and all three methods
require that the judge face the electorate in order to keep her job.  To the extent
that a judge running in a retention election is less concerned about the prospect
of losing her job, or needs to raise less money to run her campaign, the bias con-
cerns are lessened, but not entirely eliminated.  Furthermore, as I show in sec-
tion II.C below, even retention elections are becoming highly competitive and
raise many of the same bias problems.
42. “To win significant elections today costs a lot more money than it did fifty years
ago and requires a much greater media presence, particularly television advertis-
ing.”  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lawyers, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The De-
clining Influence of Lawyer-Statesmen Politicians and Lawyerly Values, 5 NEV.
L.J. 479, 498 (2005); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from
Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 452–55 (1988)
(discussing how the amount of money needed to win judicial election has in-
creased dramatically since 1960s).
43. For the purposes of this section, I sometimes use the phrase “campaign contribu-
tors” to refer both to those who gave money directly to a judicial candidate and
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whelmingly rule in favor of those who helped them fund their earlier
campaigns.44  For example, in one recent study, Michael Kang and
Joanna Shepherd analyzed a significant number of judicial decisions,
concluding that every a dollar a litigant spends on a judicial candidate
increases the likelihood that the candidate, if elected, will rule in that
litigant’s favor.45  Likewise, a New York Times study of decisions by
the Ohio Supreme Court found that justices ruled in favor of their
campaign contributors 70% of the time.46  And Ohio is not unique: an-
other study by Joanna Shepherd concluded that state supreme court
justices throughout the nation “routinely adjust their rulings to at-
tract votes and campaign money.”47  This effect is especially profound
if one of the parties (or its lawyers) made a significant contribution to
the judge’s campaign.48  And even when both sides contributed to a
judge’s campaign, the party that contributed more fares better.49
These studies offer litigants a simple lesson: if you want to win your
case, then you better pay up and hope your opponent does not pay
more.
None of this would be so troubling if lawyers and litigants that ap-
peared in front of judges rarely spent money on those judges’ cam-
paigns.  And, early in the history of judicial elections, this was the
those that made an independent expenditure to support a candidate.  While the
distinction between expenditures and contributions is significant for campaign
finance law, it makes little difference here.  In fact, even the Supreme Court, in
Caperton v. Massey, referred to the independent expenditures in that case as
campaign contributions.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873
(2009).
44. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice:
An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011); see also Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign
Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (concluding
that Ohio Supreme Court justices ruled in favor of their contributors more than
70% of the time); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case
Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002) (con-
cluding that data shows contributors to judicial elections buy changes in law);
Margaret S. Williams & Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of
Attorneys’ Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136
(2007) (concluding that some Wisconsin judges tend to rule in favor of
contributors).
45. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 44, at 73 (“We find that every dollar of contribu-
tions from business groups is associated with increases in the probability that
elected judges will decide for business litigants.”).
46. Liptak & Roberts, supra note 44, at A1.
47. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623,
625 (2009).
48. See Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Cam-
paign Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 385,
400 (2008).
49. Vernon V. Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-Caperton Era: An
Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign
Contributors, 10 GLOBAL JURIST, iss. 3, 2010, at 1, 8.
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case.  Unlike intensely competitive and highly partisan legislative and
executive elections, judicial elections, for much of their history, were
described as “sleepy,” “low key,” and “dignified.”50  Those elections
were relatively inexpensive, meaning that judges did not need to fun-
draise.51  Candidates often ran unopposed.52  Few people contributed
money to either sitting judges running for reelection, or candidates for
office,53 meaning that judges were less likely to hear a case involving
a contributor.
Today, these elections are very expensive.  In a matter of a few de-
cades, we have gone from spending almost nothing on judicial elec-
tions to spending approximately $83.3 million between 1990 and 1999
to $206.9 million from 2000 to 2009.54  And new records are set every
year.55  A judge seeking to retain his seat on the bench must rely on
others to support him.56
As a result of this transformation, it is not unusual for judges to
hear cases involving a lawyer or a party who helped the judge’s elec-
tion bid.57  For example, a recent Pennsylvania study showed that
50. Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35
IND. L. REV. 819, 819 (2002) (explaining that judicial elections “were once ‘low-
key affairs, conducted with civility and dignity’” (quoting Peter D. Webster, Selec-
tion and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best ” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 19 (1995))); David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Fu-
ture of State Judicial Selection, 69 ALB. L. REV. 985, 985 (2006) (“Judicial selec-
tion is a historically sleepy affair . . . .”)
51. SHUGERMAN, supra note 23, at 241 (describing judicial election campaigns as “rel-
atively inexpensive”).
52. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267
(2008) (describing old-style judicial elections).
53. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
185 (2006) (“Prior to the 1970s, judicial elections were sleepy events garnering
little attention and involving relatively small sums of money.”).
54. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009: DEC-
ADE OF CHANGE 8 (Charles Hall ed., 2010).
55. Jordan M. Singer, Knowing Is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective Per-
formance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 725,
730–31 (2007) (discussing record-breaking campaigns in judicial elections
throughout the United States).
56. See Pozen, supra note 52, at 306 (“[T]he time drain of campaigning has, one as-
sumes, become more pressing in recent years, as campaigns have become more
expensive and competitive.”).
57. See Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic Ac-
countability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 474 (2002)
(“Often, lawyers or litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute
large proportions of the contributions to judicial candidates.”).  A New York Times
study showed that Alabama Supreme Court justices routinely heard cases involv-
ing parties or amici who gave those justices campaign contributions.  Liptak &
Roberts, supra note 44, at A1.  Public confidence in judicial impartiality has also
suffered as a result.  In an important Justice at Stake study, 86% of those sur-
veyed expressed concern that “lawyers are the biggest campaign contributors to
judicial candidates, and they often appear in court before judges they’ve given
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nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the state supreme court in 2008
and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm that contrib-
uted to the campaign of at least one of the justices.58  Likewise, an
Illinois study concluded that 34% of the cases that the Illinois Su-
preme Court decided involved a contributor-litigant.59  This should
come as no surprise, as the parties that are most likely to appear in
front of the judge have the most interest in currying the judge’s favor
with campaign contributions or independent expenditures.60
Caperton61 itself is the prototypical example.  When it came time
to elect a justice to the West Virginia Supreme Court, Don Blanken-
ship, whose company is a frequent litigant in front of that court, was
the biggest spender.62  And despite Justice Kennedy’s repeated claims
that Caperton is unique, extreme, and unusual, that is simply not the
case.  In fact, we have seen the Caperton situation repeat itself a num-
ber of times.63
money to.” GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT
STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 8 (2001), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
69RB-9DZ8.
58. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributors and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, 93 JUDICATURE 164, 164–65 (2010).  Other surveys have
concluded that in many states “nearly half of all supreme court cases involve
someone who has given money to one or more of the judges hearing the case.”
James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Cam-
paign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 749 (2011);
Anthony J. Delligatti, A Horse of a Different Color: Distinguishing the Judiciary
from the Political Branches in Campaign Financing, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 401, 436
(2012).
59. Ronald D. Rotunda, A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry into the Connection Be-
tween Judicial Decision Making and Campaign Contributions to Judicial Candi-
dates, PROF. LAW., Winter 2003, at 16, 17.
60. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the Court appeared to
recognize that the independent expenditures, like direct contributions, by one of
the litigants to help a judge’s campaign could create an intolerable probability of
bias.  In fact, the Court repeatedly referred to the independent expenditures in
the case as “contributions.” Id. at 884–86.  This blurring surprised election law
scholars because the Court, since Buckley v. Valeo, had sustained a bright-line
distinction between the two. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976) (rec-
ognizing a constitutionally significant difference between independent expendi-
tures and direct campaign contributions).  Although the Caperton Court does not
expressly recognize that independent expenditures in judicial elections are inher-
ently corrupting, in the sense that they could be banned consistent with the First
Amendment, the Court appears to acknowledge that “there are circumstances in
which independent expenditures have the same potential to corruptly influence
the actions of elected officials as contributions.”  Richard Briffault, Super PACs,
96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1656 (2012).
61. 556 U.S. 868.
62. Id. at 873.
63. For example, just a few years earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court heard Avery v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). Avery
was an appeal of a $1 billion verdict against State Farm.  While the case was
pending, Illinois held its election for a seat on the state supreme court.  The can-
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Common sense tells us that a judge hearing a case involving a con-
tributor would feel a debt of gratitude towards that individual.  In-
deed, to feel otherwise would defy bedrock social norms.64  In other
words, even if the judge was not consciously trying to rule in favor of a
contributor, the judge may subconsciously feel an obligation to return
the contributor’s favor.
In addition, the next election is always just around the corner.
Elected state court judges generally serve shorter terms than ap-
pointed judges.  This is particularly true of lower state court judges,
who typically serve relatively short (4–8 year) terms.65  This means
that elected judges must always consider whether the same contribu-
tor would support his or her next election bid.  And, given the recent
trend in spending on judicial elections, that election bid is likely to be
more expensive than the last one.  Even judges don’t deny “that the
knowledge of the identity of a contributor is always ‘in the back of the
mind of the successful candidate.’”66
Ruling in favor of those who have helped you in the past is bad
enough.  But elected judges must also make sure potential contribu-
tors are satisfied with the judge’s work on the bench.  Every litigant
and every lawyer is either a promising friend or burgeoning foe in the
didates for that seat received a record $9.3 million in campaign contributions.
JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS, 21 (2008).  Lloyd Karmeier won the
election, having received hundreds of thousands of dollars in contributions from
State Farm employees and lawyers.  He then cast the deciding vote to overturn
the verdict against State Farm.  The United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari.  Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006).  Two other
incidents involving the Ohio Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court
are described by Roy Schotland in Comment on Professor Carrington’s Article,
“The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,” 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2002).
64. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882 (“Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his ex-
traordinary efforts to get him elected.”); Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial,
and the Appearance of Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influ-
ence of Campaign Contributions on Judges’ Decisions, 26 J.L. & POL. 359, 366
(2011) (discussing the “reciprocity principle,” which is the notion that once an
individual benefits from an action of another, it is expected that the recipient of
the benefit return the favor).
65. See Roy A. Schotland, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Should Judges be
More Like Politicians?, JUDGES J., Summer 2002, at 7, 10 (discussing the effect of
short terms for judges on judicial independence).  For an excellent discussion on
the interrelationship between judicial independence, accountability, and the
length of judicial terms, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long
Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J.
1349 (2010).
66. Banner, supra note 42, at 452–55.
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election just around the corner.67  In a survey of nearly 2,500 state
judges, almost half (46%) expressed “a belief that campaign contribu-
tions influence judges’ decisions.”68  More than 70% of these judges
“expressed concern regarding the fact that ‘[i]n some states, nearly
half of all supreme court cases involve someone who has given money
to one or more of the judges hearing the case.’”69
2. Keeping the Electorate Happy
In an influential 1995 article, Professor Steven Croley coined the
term “majoritarian difficulty.”70  The difficulty is this: an elected judge
may be tempted to resolve a case according to the preferences of the
majority (i.e., the people that will decide whether the judge remains in
the job), even if doing so is contrary to the law.71  This means that the
unpopular litigant might lose the case because the judge might be
worried about how the case will affect his reelection odds.  To keep his
job, the judge must anticipate how voters will react to a decision, and
whether ruling in favor of a certain litigant will cost the judge votes at
the polls.
As with money, the majoritarian difficulty was at one time only
difficult in theory.  When judicial elections were less salient, an
elected judge had little to worry about.72  Incumbents often ran unop-
posed, and even when they faced a challenger, incumbents almost al-
67. No state elects judges for life, meaning that for elected judges who do not plan to
retire or step down from the bench, another election is always in the back (or the
front) of their minds.  This is particularly true of lower state court judges, who
typically serve relatively short (4–8 years) terms. See supra note 65 and accom-
panying text.
68. Sample, supra note 58, at 749.
69. Id. (quoting GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE
AT STAKE—STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 9 (2002), archived at http:/
/perma.unl.edu/5RUS-YT7Y).
70. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995).  The majoritarian difficulty is the
counter to Alexander Bickel’s famous countermajoritarian difficulty, which has
been at the heart of all constitutional theory. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); see also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Aca-
demic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five,
112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty).
71. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty,
96 VA. L. REV. 719, 731 (2010) (“[E]lective judiciaries pose a risk to the rule of
law, which is compromised whenever a judge’s ruling is influenced by majority
preferences.”).
72. Of course, every judge might be concerned about public perception of the judge’s
work product, including federal judges who are appointed for life. See Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586 (1993) (“[C]ourts do not trump major-
ity will, or remain unaccountable to majority sentiment, nearly to the extent usu-
ally depicted.”).
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ways won.73  Unlike elections for other elected office, judges felt safe
in their job, knowing that they were out of any public limelight.
That has all changed in recent years.  As judicial elections have
become more competitive, individual rulings face closer scrutiny—and
pose a greater risk to a judge’s career.74  As Justice Otto Klaus fa-
mously remarked, “There’s no way a judge is going to be able to ignore
the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she
has to make them near election time.  That would be like ignoring a
crocodile in your bathtub.”75  In recent years, a number of judges have
either lost elections as a result of unpopular decisions, or squeaked out
narrow victories after their opponents used unpopular decisions
against them.  Most recently, three justices of the Iowa Supreme
Court were voted out of office in a retention election for their contro-
versial decision to strike down a state statute defining marriage as
between a man and a woman.76  On average, of course, incumbents
are still likely to win their reelection, but the job is no longer a safe
one for a sitting judge.77  And as judicial elections become more and
more competitive, pressures to appease and impress the electorate
will continue to increase.
73. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 2047, 2051 (2010) (“Under the traditional model of judicial elec-
tions . . . incumbents almost always won . . . .”).
74. See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 75 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (“Sitting judges facing an
imminent election . . . know that every decision is potentially fodder for the oppo-
sition.  When well-heeled or well-organized interest groups can seize on isolated
opinions—even well-reasoned decisions that have been joined by a majority of
other judges on the court—as the basis for attack ads in the next campaign, it
takes extraordinary integrity and real courage for a judge facing reelection to
support a ruling that plainly will be unpopular.”); Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins,
Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 27, 33 (2011) (“[P]ast judicial elections have taught that
justices can be ousted due to their vote in a single case on one of these topics,
often a vote portrayed incorrectly or deceptively by the opposition campaign or
interest group.”).
75. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58.
76. See Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715 (2011); see also Whitney Woodward, 2010 Justice
Kilbride Retention in Illinois, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 843 (2012) (describing Illinois
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Kilbride’s victory); Press Release, Justice at
Stake & Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Gay Marriage, Tax Fights Spark High-Profile
Court Races (Sept. 23, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EB4V-VSDG (dis-
cussing relatively close races in Kansas and Colorado).
77. Some estimate the judicial election races are now at least as competitive as races
for the U.S. House of Representatives. See Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme
Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 315, 319 (2001) (“The fact of the matter . . . is that supreme court
justices face competition that is, by two of three measures, equivalent if not
higher to that for the U.S. House.”).
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Groups and individuals that are unpopular with the local electo-
rate are the biggest victims of the majoritarian difficulty.  For exam-
ple, studies show that judges are biased against out-of-state
defendants.  One study demonstrated that the average damages
award in a civil case was $150,000 higher against out-of-state defend-
ants.78  Of course, this redistribution of wealth to in-state litigants is
entirely rational—taking care of the local donors and voters takes pri-
ority.79  In the words of West Virginia Justice Richard Neely, “As long
as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to
injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. . . . [M]y my job
security [is enhanced] because the in-state plaintiffs, their families,
and their friends will reelect me.”80
Another unpopular group is criminal defendants, and they, too, fall
victim to the majoritarian difficulty.  As judicial elections approach,
elected judges tend to sentence criminal defendants more harshly.81
And when that sentence is the death penalty, an elected judge is much
more likely to sentence a defendant to death when judicial elections
are close.82  One study found that “criminal defendants [convicted of
murder] were approximately 15% more likely to be sentenced to death
when the sentence was issued during the judge’s election year.”83
This, too, comes as no surprise as criminal justice issues figure promi-
nently in contested judicial elections.84  In the words of Ninth Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski:
While many, perhaps, most judges resist the pressure and remain impartial,
the fact that they may have to face the voters with the combined might of the
prosecution and police groups aligned against them no doubt causes some
78. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 162–63 (1999) (concluding that elected judges fre-
quently redistribute wealth from out-of-state defendants to in-state plaintiffs).
79. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 289
(2002) (“[A]n elected judge may rationally favor in-state plaintiffs, who vote and
have friends and relatives who vote, over out-of-state corporations.”).
80. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988).
81. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Jus-
tice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (“[A]ll
judges, even the most punitive, increase their sentences as reelection
nears . . . .”).
82. Richard R. W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Croley, supra note 70, at 737–39 (citing an increase in the number of elections
where an incumbent judge loses because of criminal justice issues); cf. Kyle D.
Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a Bell-
wether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003) (explaining that even
advocates of tort reform frequently pay for appeals to criminal justice issues be-
cause those issues are more salient for voters).
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judges to rule for the prosecution in cases where they would otherwise have
ruled for the defense.85
And regardless of the type of case, empirical evidence seems to sup-
port the intuition of the majoritarian difficulty.  A number of studies
by Joanna Shepherd and others demonstrate that elected judges tend
to decide cases at least partly in accordance with the preference of the
electorate.86  According to Shepherd, “[W]hen judges face [conserva-
tive electorates] in partisan reelections, they are more likely to [rule]
for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes, for
doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for businesses in
products liability cases, for original defendants in tort cases, and
against criminals in criminal appeals.”87  Admittedly, every judge
without life tenure must consider retention politics,88 but elected
judges do it at a significantly higher level than appointed judges.  And
with good reason: their jobs depend on it.
3. Perception of Bias
So far, we’ve only discussed evidence of real bias.  But there is an-
other kind of bias that arises as a result of modern judicial elections:
the appearance of bias.  The legitimacy of our justice system relies in
large part on public perception of impartiality—“[P]ublic perception of
the courts as impartial . . . is essential to the effective operation of the
judicial process.”89  In the words of Justice Kennedy, “[T]he law com-
mands allegiance only if it commands respect.  It commands respect
only if the public thinks the judges are neutral.”90
Three relevant groups also believe that the electoral process influ-
ences judicial decisions.  First, judges confirm they take electoral con-
siderations into account when making legal judgments.91  In one
85. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Preface, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. iii, xxxviii-xxxix (2015).
86. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J.
LEGAL STUD. 169, 169 (2009) (“The evidence supports the widespread belief that
judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected.”)
87. See Shepherd, supra note 47, at 661.
88. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589
(2009).  In other words, even judges who are reappointed by the governor or the
state legislature seem to exhibit biases towards those reappointing agents.
89. DUBOIS, supra note 37, at 21–22.
90. Peter A. Joy, Insulation Needed for Elected Judges, 22 NAT’L L.J., Jan. 10, 2000,
at A19, A19 (quoting Justice Anthony Kennedy, Interview by Bill Moyers with
Justices Stephen Breyer and Anthony Kennedy, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/WH9U-NN9W).
91. See Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Ju-
diciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
839, 842 (1994) (“Judges admit that they cannot completely trust themselves to
hold in check the threats to their independence presented by judicial elections.”);
Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77
JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994) (“[E]ven though judges rarely lose retention elections
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study, more than 25% of the respondents believed that contributions
have at least “some influence” on judicial decisions; approximately
50% thought the contributions have at least “a little influence.”92
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E. Pfeifer nicely summarized how
judges feel.  He said, “I never felt so much like a hooker down by the
bus station in any race I’ve ever been in as I did in a judicial race.
Everyone interested in contributing has very specific interests.  They
mean to be buying a vote.”93  Second, the contributors believe that
their contributions make a difference.94  In the words of an anony-
mous AFL-CIO official, “[I]t’s easier to elect seven judges than to elect
132 legislators.”95  And finally, approximately 80% of the public
thought judges were biased in favor of their contributors.96  A similar
percentage thought that judicial decisions were influenced by political
considerations.97  While these surveys do not alone prove that judges
are indeed biased, they show that judicial elections create a strong
appearance of bias, and that in and of itself is a problem for the
judiciary.98
C. Failed Solutions
While this evidence may seem shocking at first, none of it comes as
a surprise to judicial-selection scholars.  For many years, academics
have recognized the potential for bias that results from the judicial
selection and retention process.  Some scholars have even argued that
judicial elections are unconstitutional precisely because of these con-
cerns.99  After all, the Constitution guarantees impartial judges100
and only 34.9% believe a poor judge will be voted out, still three-fifths believe
judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judicial behavior.”).
92. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, supra note 69, at 5.
93. Liptak & Roberts, supra note 44, at A1.
94. ADAM SKAGGS, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 4–7 (2010) (summarizing evidence demonstrating that judicial cam-
paign contributors believe that their spending influences judicial decisions).
95. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 54, at 9.
96. Geyh, supra note 1.
97. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY 41 (1999), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RW5W-U5X3; see
also Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword to SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 54, at i, i (“We
all expect judges to be accountable to the law rather than political supporters or
special interests.  But elected judges in many states are compelled to solicit
money for their election campaigns, sometimes from lawyers and parties appear-
ing before them. . . . [This leads to] a crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary.”).
98. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 867 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The gov-
ernmental interest in an independent and impartial judiciary is matched by its
equally important interest in preserving public confidence in that independence
and impartiality.”), rev’d, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
99. Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State
Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular
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and an unbiased, neutral adjudication “on the basis of the facts and
law of their individual cases.”101  Without a fair, impartial judge, all
other constitutional safeguards are rendered meaningless102 and the
judiciary’s legitimacy suffers.  None of our other rights—and laws—
matter if the judges enforcing those rights are not impartial.
Three major solutions have been offered to address the problem.
These solutions include eliminating judicial elections, reforming judi-
cial elections, and enhancing judicial recusal rules.  But these solu-
tions have failed for a number of different reasons: because they are
poorly suited to address the problem, because they are highly unpopu-
lar with the public, or because they have been held—or are likely to be
held—unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
1. Eliminating Elections
A favorite pastime of judicial selection scholars is critiquing judi-
cial elections.103  As David Pozen has observed, “disdain for elective
judiciaries” is the dominant theme of the legal literature on judicial
selection.104  In the words of Roy Schotland, “[M]ore sweat and ink
have been spent on getting rid of judicial elections than on any other
Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); Martin H. Redish & Law-
rence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 (1986) (“[I]n [at least some cases], the use of non-
tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of procedural due process.”).
100. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to an
impartial jurist is central to due process. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986).
101. Redish & Aronoff, supra note 99, at 9; see also Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (holding
that the presence of a judge with an interest in the outcome of the case violates
due process); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality
and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 610 (2002) (“Judicial
impartiality is one of the core elements of due process.”).
102. Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at 457, 479 (observing that procedural due
process requires a neutral adjudicator).  Professors Redish and Marshall explain
that “[t]he rights to notice, hearing, counsel, transcript, and to calling and cross-
examining witnesses . . . are of no real value . . . if the decisionmaker bases his
findings on factors other than his assessment of the evidence before him.” Id. at
476.
103. See generally Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2596, 2604 (2003); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Inde-
pendence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 41 (2003) (“There is wide-
spread dissatisfaction today with the operation of judicial elections.”).  The
support for judicial elections largely comes from political scientists rather than
lawyers and law professors. See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL,
IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009).
104. Pozen, supra note 52, at 278.  There is a rich body of scholarship evaluating dif-
ferent judicial selection and retention mechanisms.  It is beyond the scope of this
Article to summarize that scholarship, but it overwhelmingly concludes that judi-
cial elections are a poor way of selecting judges.
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single subject in the history of American law.”105  Thousands of arti-
cles criticize judicial elections for a wide range of reasons106: because
they are unseemly,107 because they discourage the best candidates
from running,108 or because they threaten judicial independence109
and judicial impartiality.110
And the academics are not alone.  In response to many of the con-
cerns discussed earlier, the American Bar Association has called on
states to end the practice of electing judges entirely.111  Instead, the
ABA recommends that governors appoint judges to serve a single term
until a specified age.112  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has also been
the public face of the campaign against judicial elections.113  Although
O’Connor is an opponent of all judicial elections, she has taken a more
moderate position, calling for states to replace contested judicial elec-
tions with the merit-selection scheme.114  And this is just the “tip of
105. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998).
106. There are a few exceptions. For example, Michael Dimino has argued that while
judicial elections are not perfect, neither are the other methods of judicial selec-
tion, suggesting judicial elections are the best way of selecting judges. See
Michael Dimino, The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All the Others That
Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (2005).  Leading defenders of judicial
elections are Melinda Gann Hall and Chris Bonneau. See BONNEAU & HALL,
supra note 103.
107. Croley, supra note 70, at 69 n.22.
108. See, e.g., Harold Laski, The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV.
529, 531–32 (1926) (arguing that the most qualified candidates may shy away
from running for office, causing the public to rarely choose the best qualified
candidates).
109. Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Inde-
pendence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367 (2002).
110. Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 COR-
NELL L. REV. 191, 233 (2012).
111. See Jessica Leval Mener, The Aftermath of Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission: Preventing Impropriety While Encouraging the Free Flow of Infor-
mation in Judicial Elections, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 713, 730 (2011) (discussing
the “ABA’s mission to end judicial elections”).
112. No state currently uses exactly such a system.  Rhode Island is the only state that
grants judges life tenure.  Two others—Massachusetts and New Hampshire—re-
quire judges to retire when they reach a mandatory retirement age. See Judicial
Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://
www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/5SD9-TTWS (describing the selection methodology for each state).
113. Other judges and Justices have criticized judicial elections. See, e.g., Justice
John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association An-
nual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, August 3, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 21, 30–31 (1996) (criticizing judicial elections); Chief Justice Margaret H.
Marshall, President of the Conference of Chief Justices, Remarks to the Ameri-
can Bar Association House of Delegates (Feb. 16, 2009) (judicial elections are the
“single greatest threat to judicial independence”), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/F92S-7MCF.
114. See supra section II.A (discussing merit-based selection).
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the iceberg of the opposition to judicial elections.”115  The list of elec-
tion opponents is long and filled with current and former legal law-
yers, judges, and politicians.
Some scholars have gone beyond merely criticizing judicial elec-
tions to in fact argue that such elections are unconstitutional.  For ex-
ample, Aviva Abramovsky argued that the only way to restore judicial
impartiality, at least in the post-Citizens United world, is to end judi-
cial elections.116  Likewise, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that judi-
cial elections are inconsistent with the idea of judicial impartiality
and the rule of law.117  In recent years, arguments that judicial elec-
tions are unconstitutional have gained some traction.  To ensure fair
and impartial judges, as required by the Due Process Clause, Martin
Redish and Jennifer Aronoff argue that “life tenure, or, at the very
least, some form of formal term limit is required.”118  Lawyers have
also essayed to make similar arguments in legal briefs, albeit with no
success.119
Sitting judges, too, have also spoken out against judicial elec-
tions.120  In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justices Gins-
burg and Stevens stopped short of declaring judicial elections
unconstitutional, but their views on judicial elections are clear.  In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the announce clause, which the
Court upheld, is constitutional because due process would be denied if
an elected judge sat in a case involving an issue on which he had pre-
viously announced his view.121  Such a judge would have a “direct,
personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest” in ruling consistently
with his previously announced view to minimize the risk that the
judge would lose his job.122
With all these voices simultaneously opposing judicial elections,
one would think that eliminating elections would be a simple task.
115. MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES 1 (2015).
116. See, e.g., Aviva Abramovsky, Justice for Sale: Contemplations on the “Impartial”
Judge in a Citizens United World, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 717 (2012)
(“[T]here are only two legitimate societal choices available, accept the entrance of
a pervasive, increasingly powerful influence on judges and its corollary of ever
decreasing faith of the public in judges, or end judicial elections entirely.”).
117. Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985,
1988 (1988) (“[R]ule of law requires that judges decide cases based on their views
of the legal merits, not based on what will please voters.”).
118. Redish & Aronoff, supra note 99, at 2; see Redish & Marshall, supra note 99, at
498 (“[T]he use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of proce-
dural due process” in at least some cases).
119. See, e.g., Brief for Idaho Conservation League and Louisiana Environmental Ac-
tion Network as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Side at 24–30, Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).
120. Justice O’Connor is at the forefront of that movement.
121. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
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But one group overwhelmingly favors judicial elections, and it is the
one group that matters most: the people themselves.  Despite their
concerns about biased elected judges,123 approximately 80% of the
public supports judicial elections.124  Recent efforts to move away
from judicial elections have failed.125  In fact, since judicial elections
came to be the dominant form of judicial selection in the nineteenth
century, no state has abandoned judicial elections to revert to a purely
appointive system.126  Doing so would require voters to deprive them-
selves of the right to vote, and that is not likely to happen.  And al-
though there is nothing illogical about a hybrid system of judicial
elections followed by a single long term, or perhaps even life tenure,127
the electorate seems uninterested in retaining the power to elect
judges while abandoning power to hold those judges accountable for
their decisions in office.
Not only has the movement to eliminate judicial elections failed to
gain traction with the public, but the Court does not seem sympathetic
to arguments that judicial elections are unconstitutional, either.  In
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Scalia preemptively
rejected any such arguments.  Justice Scalia wrote:
[If] it violates due process for a judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way
rather than another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite sim-
ply—the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of due pro-
cess. . . . [These views] are not, however, the views reflected in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has coexisted with the
election of judges ever since it was adopted.128
It is clear, therefore, that judicial elections are not going away.129
If we are going to solve the problem of biased judges then it will not be
by eliminating judicial elections, but rather by correcting for the bi-
ases that such elections create.
123. Geyh, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that 80% of the electorate believes that elected
judges are biased in favor of those campaign contributors who helped the judges’
election campaign).
124. Id. at 72; Hall, supra note 34, at 73.
125. See, e.g., Chris W. Bonneau, Op-Ed., Why We Should Keep Judicial Elections,
WASH. POST (May 26, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-
should-keep-judicial-elections/2011/05/26/AGt08HCH_story.html, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/X9PG-7CS8 (describing Justice O’Connor’s failed effort in
Nevada to eliminate the practice of partisan judicial elections).
126. In the last sixty years, twelve states abandoned partisan elections in favor of non-
partisan elections and merit selection (which includes retention elections).  Six
other states abandoned non-partisan elections, again in favor of merit selection.
HALL, supra note 115, at 7.
127. The most prominent proponent of such an approach is Professor Michael Dimino.
See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451, 457 (2008).
128. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782–83 (2002).
129. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 71, at 721 (“[E]lected judges are here to stay.”).
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2. Election Reform
Recognizing that the fight to eliminate judicial elections is a lost
cause, some have suggested that judicial elections can at least be
transformed to reduce or eliminate the factors that lead to judicial
bias.  For example, to address the concern that elected judges favor
their contributors, some have sought to shepherd in a system of public
funding for judicial elections, greater restrictions on campaign contri-
butions to judicial candidates, and more robust disclosure of campaign
contributions.130  To address the concern that judges tailor their deci-
sions to the preferences of the electorate, reformers have suggested
providing voter information pamphlets,131 including more information
on the ballot,132 and a greater regulation and monitoring of judicial
campaign conduct.133
The primary goal of these reforms is to ease, if not eliminate, some
of the electoral pressure that judges feel as a result of: (1) facing the
electorate to keep their jobs, and (2) deciding cases involving their con-
tributors.  The good news is that when it comes to this type of reform,
the people are no longer an impediment, as many see the electoral
system as broken—maybe even corrupt.134  The bad news is that
there is another impediment: the Supreme Court.
If a major problem regarding judicial bias is the presence of money,
then perhaps the solution is to get the money out of the system.  But
most campaign-financing efforts have been decimated by recent Court
decisions.  For example, some states have experimented with public
financing of judicial elections,135 but at the core of such a system is a
matching funds provision.  A matching funds provision is necessary to
ensure that if one candidate opts out of public financing and accepts
contributions from donors, the other candidate can still run a competi-
tive race by obtaining matching funds from the state.  Without match-
ing funds, public financing schemes fall apart.136  In Arizona Free
Enterprise Club, the Supreme Court eviscerated such provisions, hold-
130. Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1483, 1515 (2005).
131. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial
Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
115, 129–30 (2008).
132. Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553, 555
(2014).
133. The idea here is that judges are more likely to rule in favor of the preferences of
the electorate when they have promised the electorate to rule a certain way in the
court during their campaign for office.
134. See Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices
for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 168 (2007).
135. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1 (LexisNexis 2013).
136. Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court’s Proper Support of
Judicial Elections, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1521, 1547 (2011) (“Given that candi-
dates and corporations can spend their own money without limit, public financing
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ing that they violate the First Amendment, and essentially taking
public financing off the table as a means to curb the influence of
money in judicial elections.137  For example, North Carolina recently
experimented with public financing for judicial elections.  The experi-
ment was largely unsuccessful as many candidates simply chose to opt
out of the system, and the Court’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club severely limited the states’ ability to reward those individuals
who opted into the system.138
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also clarified that candi-
dates and corporations can spend their money without limit.139  Since
the days of Buckley v. Valeo,140 states have had broad discretion to
limit campaign contributions, but those limits are also under at-
tack.141  In any event, it is not the contributions that are the problem.
Take Caperton: Burt Blankenship contributed only a few thousand
dollars to Justice Benjamin’s campaign, but spent millions to get Jus-
tice Benjamin elected.142  When it comes to the gratitude that Justice
Benjamin would feel toward Blankenship, there is no meaningful dif-
ference between contributions and expenditures that equally help Jus-
tice Benjamin get elected.
Efforts to restrict candidates’ campaign speech have likewise been
dealt severe blows.  Many states have historically prohibited judicial
candidates from announcing their positions on cases likely to come
before them.  But in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Su-
preme Court held that such bans also violate the First Amendment.143
As a result, regulations on judicial speech and conduct are presump-
tively unconstitutional.  Judges now frequently hit the campaign trail,
discussing their positions on issues they are likely to see once on the
bench, with the concomitant pressure to live up to those promises once
on the bench.144
These reform efforts also suffer from a theoretical concern: why
elect judges at all if we are going to regulate judicial elections in a way
is necessary, but it is an attractive option to candidates only if they can receive
matching funds to keep pace with their privately funded rivals.”)
137. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding
that the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent expenditures by
a nonprofit corporation).
140. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
141. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating aggre-
gate contribution limits by holding they violate the First Amendment).
142. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
143. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
144. See Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy,
Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010) (highlighting numerous in-
stances of promises to be tough on crime that judges make in the course of their
campaign).
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that limits the candidates’ ability to convey their message to the pub-
lic and limits lawyers’ and litigants’ ability to inform the electorate
about potentially erroneous decisions for which judges should be held
accountable.  The public is already relatively uninformed about judi-
cial candidates and making it more difficult for judges (and others) to
inform the voters seems counterintuitive to how we usually approach
elections.  Without judicial campaign speech and extensive (and ex-
pensive) advertising, voters are left in the dark.  This forces voters to
rely on cues that are entirely irrelevant, like candidates’ names, or
cues that make little sense in an election for a state trial judge, like
party affiliations.145  So while campaign contributions, expenditures,
and promises to decide cases a certain way make judges more biased,
they also make judicial elections more legitimate.146
3. Recusal
But what about recusal?  After all, recusal is at the core of judicial
ethics codes147 and state recusal statutes,148 and is at the heart of our
current approach to the problem of judicial bias.149  Under the Rules
of Judicial Conduct in every state, a biased judge (or even one who
appears to be biased) must step aside.150  And even if judicial elections
lead to judicial bias, perhaps those biased judges can, ex post, be pro-
hibited from hearing certain cases.
Scholars have suggested that recusal is a potentially viable solu-
tion to the problem of judicial bias.  Some have argued that recusal is
“the only effective means to ensure the impartiality of elected
145. Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the Mo-
ment May Decide Your Future, 18 J.L. & POL. 643, 690 (2002) (describing the
importance of name recognition and ballot position and their impact on the likeli-
hood of electoral success for a judicial candidate).
146. See Pozen, supra note 52 (describing this irony).
147. See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); N.M. CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT, R. 21-400 (2004).
148. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (2012); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 151
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (2003).
149. There is, perhaps, one other alternative: educating the electorate about the judi-
cial role and educating judges about bias, including unconscious and subcon-
scious bias. See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as
the Fundamental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis,” 99
KY. L.J. 259, 295–324 (2011) (suggesting such strategies).  I, too, have written
about creating a more informed electorate, with the hope that this would lead
judges to be less fearful about losing their jobs based on individual unpopular
decisions. See Bam, supra note 132.  While I continue to believe these efforts are
important, such efforts permit the sources of bias to continue and are unlikely to
be entirely adequate.
150. See, e.g., TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2002); see generally Gabriel
D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38
PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151–73 (2011) (reviewing the recusal codes and statutes in
all fifty states).
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judges,”151 and that “recusal reform offers an effective, constitutional
means of solving” the judicial bias problem that results from judicial
elections.152  In fact, recusal can arguably be “precisely targeted to
preventing due process problems . . . without restricting campaign
speech at all.”153  In the last decade, and especially since Caperton,
recusal has been a frequent topic in law journals.
Judges, too, have suggested that recusal can be a remedy to the
election-related bias problem.  In his Republican Party v. White con-
currence, Justice Kennedy endorsed more stringent recusal standards
as one acceptable means of preserving judicial impartiality.154  In
other words, to the extent that judicial campaigning endorsed by the
Court’s decision in White creates either bias or the appearance of bias,
Justice Kennedy explained that stricter recusal standards can elimi-
nate that problem.  Lower court judges have followed suit,155 sug-
gesting that even if judicial elections lead to judicial bias, recusal
ensures that an impartial arbiter will hear the case.
This focus on recusal is not surprising.  Recusal has tremendous
allure because, at least in theory, it allows us to ensure judicial impar-
tiality at the point of delivery.  If recusal works to remedy election-
related judicial bias, then states can continue with the practice of judi-
cial elections with no concern about election-related bias influencing
judicial decision-making.  But, for two reasons, recusal does not work.
a. Self-Recusal Procedure Is Inadequate
One important reason why recusal has failed is the self-recusal
procedure.  In most states, as in the federal courts, judges decide their
own recusal motions.156  This recusal procedure has been followed
throughout the United States since the country’s founding, and was
151. McLucas, supra note 14, at 692 (emphasis added).
152. Stott, supra note 14, at 482; see also Mark Andrew Grannis, Safeguarding the
Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process
Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions from
Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 415 (1987) (explaining that recusal is “a manage-
able solution to the problem of possible judicial bias”).
153. Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Re-
sponse to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 568–70 (2004).
154. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
155. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 763 F. Supp.
128, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (contending that judges whose impartiality could be
questioned because of campaign promises could be required to recuse themselves
under the state code of judicial conduct); Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v.
Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 702 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (same).
156. Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Rea-
sonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411,
448 (2014).
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followed in England for centuries before that.157  While there are some
exceptions, the judge’s decision is final, subject only to appellate re-
view.  That appellate review, however, is generally highly deferential
to the judge’s decision, and reversals are rare.158
This self-recusal procedure is particularly inappropriate when it
comes to addressing election-related judicial bias for several reasons.
First, in the course of their campaigns, candidates for judicial office
make all sorts of statements, announcements, and promises.159  In the
next election, voters are likely to expect the judge to have some record
as to the category of cases where the judge made promises before.  As
a result, one might expect judges to hesitate before disqualifying
themselves from cases involving issues about which they had cam-
paigned (and, presumably, the issues that voters care about most).160
Judges who recuse themselves from the cases voters care about most
might find themselves out of a job.161
157. See John A. Meiser, The (Non) Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial
Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799, 1803 (2009) (“[O]ur recusal proce-
dures grew out of English common law practice.”).
158. Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. REV.
1951, 1990 (2013) (“[S]elf-recusal decisions are reviewed deferentially and rarely
reversed on appeal . . . .”).
159. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 71, at 734 (describing the efforts of special interest
groups to obtain judicial disclosure of their views and positions on contested
issues).
160. See James Layman, Judicial Campaign Speech Regulation: Integrity or Incen-
tives?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 769, 775 (2006) (“[I]f a judge is required to recuse
himself on all issues related to his campaign promises, “the voters do not get
what they believe they were promised.” (citations omitted)).  While there have
been few studies of voter expectations in judicial elections, studies of candidates
running for office in other elections suggest that those candidates expect voters to
evaluate them based on their record in office. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 72–76 (1990) (arguing that voters evaluate the
probability that a candidate will choose a voter-preferred policy based on an eval-
uation of the candidate’s records).
161. In fact, some have argued that requiring recusal under these circumstances un-
dermines the purpose of judicial elections.  Why have elections, the argument
goes, if any substantive information that a candidate can provide to a voter about
what they would do when in office disables the judge from doing what they prom-
ised?  According to some scholars, providing voters with information about a
judge, and then requiring the judge who provided the information to recuse from
those cases, “work[s] a fraud on the voters.”  Randall T. Shepard, Campaign
Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 1059, 1076
(1996); see also Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3 FIRST AMENDMENT L.
REV. 5, 63–75 (2004) (arguing that mandatory recusal rules might run afoul of
First Amendment); Andrea Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and
Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977, 1013 (2011) (“If
recusal burdens speech, then affording too much weight to a litigant’s due process
rights may infringe upon the presiding judge’s right to speak outside the court-
room, including on the campaign trail, thus harming the marketplace of ideas.”).
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The second reason why the self-recusal procedure is ill-suited to
addressing election-related judicial bias is that judges might feel that
recusing themselves for their campaign statements and conduct would
imply that the campaigning itself had been improper.  In addition, the
ethics codes require judges to recuse sua sponte, meaning that recusal
motions put judges in a difficult spot: “[A] successful motion to recuse
requires the [judge] to admit that he failed in the first instance to ad-
here to statutory and ethical requirements.”162  Even an unbiased
judge may worry that a recusal sends a message that he is biased.163
Third, the self-recusal procedure is the least effective precisely
when it is needed most.  Take, for example, the situation where a
judge is biased in favor of a financial contributor to the judge’s previ-
ous election.164  Recusal eliminates the judge’s ability to repay his
debt of gratitude.165  And if a judge does recuse himself in every case
involving that contributor, that contributor is likely to take his money
elsewhere.  As a result, the more biased the target judge is, the less
likely that judge is to recuse himself.166  In fact, in a study of judicial
voting by the Ohio Supreme Court, the New York Times found that in
“the 215 cases with the most direct potential conflicts of interest, jus-
tices recused themselves just 9 times.”167
Moreover, judges rarely recognize their own biases, or even the ap-
pearance of bias, because such bias is often subconscious.168  Take
Caperton’s Justice Benjamin: he was convinced that he was not bi-
ased, and presumably, since he did not recuse, that no one could per-
162. R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance
& Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799,
1833–34 (2005).
163. James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous, 46
JUDGES J. 17, 20 (2007).
164. Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
699, 700 (1995) (“Ordinary rules of social interaction impose obligations of grati-
tude and loyalty on those who receive a significant benefit.”).
165. In Caperton, the Supreme Court emphasized the debt of gratitude that Justice
Benjamin owed to Bert Blankenship as one of the reasons recusal was required
under the Due Process Clause.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
882 (2009).
166. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Ju-
dicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
167. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J6SM-UBVY.
168. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1333 (2006)
(“Because so many biases operate on subconscious levels, it is often difficult for
individuals to gauge the factors that may skew judgment.”).  The work of Jeffrey
Rachlinkski, Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie has demonstrated that judges
suffer from similar unconscious biases as the general population. See Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009).
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ceive him as biased.169  Modern research in cognitive psychology tells
us why—the cognitive biases that affect judicial decisions make it im-
possible for judges to assess their own conduct dispassionately and
open-mindedly.170  Social science literature refers to this as the “Bias
Blind Spot.”171  The Bias Blind Spot means that everyone, including
judges, makes important decisions in a manner skewed to favor their
own self-interest.172  As a result of this tendency, people tend to think
they are better than they actually are at a number of different tasks
and on a number of different criteria, including fairness and imparti-
ality.173  Judges are not immune: they overestimate their ability to
remain impartial and ignore evidence of judicial bias.174
And while shifting the recusal decision to another judge may fix
the constitutional objections to the self-recusal procedure, such a shift
is unlikely to be a panacea.  Judges respect each other, and hesitate to
impugn each other’s ability to remain impartial.175  Furthermore, no
third party can decide whether another judge is actually biased with-
out a true adversarial process where both sides present evidence of
their state of mind.  Recusal is a dispute between a judge and a liti-
169. Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Dis-
qualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 235, 276 (2013) (“Justice Benjamin did what most of us do when evaluat-
ing our own biases—he succumbed to the Introspection Illusion, which confirmed
his belief that he was not biased in this specific instance.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of Judicial
Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 53–56 (2010) (discussing the standards ap-
plied, and conclusions reached, by Justice Benjamin).
170. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 913 (1999) (discussing unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The
Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litiga-
tion, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–80 (2000) (discussing self-serving bias).
171. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 (2002).
172. See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 567, 568 (2003).
173. See David Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J. EXPER. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 480 (1985).
174. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Ju-
diciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J.
1477, 1519–20 (2009).  Interestingly, judges are able to identify this bias in their
colleagues, but not in themselves.  Most judges simply see themselves as “above
average.”  Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 166, at 814–15.
175. Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1237 (2002) (discussing the “resistance of other appellate
judges to the idea of evaluating allegations of bias or prejudice against their col-
leagues”); Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias—The Stan-
dard Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 767 (1973) (“Many courts are
understandably reluctant to disqualify a fellow judge since a finding of actual
prejudice . . . impugns both that judge’s qualifications and those of the system he
represents.”).
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gant, and an adversarial process that allows those two sides to present
their dispute to a neutral third party would be cumbersome and
inefficient.176
b. Every Judge Is Potentially Biased
Admittedly, in some circumstances, recusal works well.  For exam-
ple, recusal is perfectly suited for a situation where one can identify a
specific source of bias from which a particular judge suffers.  If the
source of bias is unique to the judge in question—perhaps the judge
owns stock in one of the corporate litigants, or has a close relationship
with one of the parties, or has personal knowledge of the facts of the
case—then recusal is a perfect fit.177  The sources of bias are objec-
tively identifiable, and other judges who do not suffer from the same
biases may be found.  Removing the biased judge from the case elimi-
nates the bias entirely.178
But for election-related bias, things are not so simple.  The
majoritarian difficulty affects every state judge who must run for re-
election.  No judge is safe from the threat of losing the next election.
Every judge must consider how her decisions will be characterized in
the next election cycle or how potential contributors would react to the
decision.  When it comes to this election-related bias, recusal is inade-
quate.  Removing one judge who feels pressure to tailor his rulings
towards a potential reelection bid, and replacing him with another
judge who feels identical pressure, does little to ensure judicial impar-
tiality.  The case must still be heard by a judge—there is simply no
way to get around that requirement—and every judge will suffer from
the same job-security biases.  This is particularly true with the
majoritarian difficulty; it applies to all elected judges, not just those
who received campaign contributions.  In short, current recusal rules
leave judges essentially immune from punishment for acting in a bi-
ased manner,179 and when it comes to election-related judicial bias,
recusal seems to be an inadequate solution.
176. Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural
Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 171–72 (2004) (discuss-
ing the efficiency concerns of third-party review of recusal decisions).
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2011) (listing specific circumstances when judicial dis-
qualification is required).
178. For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), a judge must recuse if he has “personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”  Replacing
that judge with one who does not have such “personal knowledge” alleviates the
problem entirely. Id.
179. I am not suggesting a draconian check is necessary. Cf. M.H. Hoeflich, Regula-
tion of Judicial Misconduct from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 LAW
& HIST. REV. 79, 82 (1984) (discussing the approaches adopted throughout Eu-
rope in the seventh and eighth centuries, including liability to the aggrieved
party (and sometimes even the crown) on judges who decided cases as a result of
favoritism to the other party).
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III. AN ORIGINALIST SOLUTION: THE JURY AS A CHECK ON
JUDICIAL BIAS
For many years, scholars have decried judicial elections and sought
answers to the judicial-bias problem described in Part II.  Nonethe-
less, there has been little headway.  Now, with every new study show-
ing the extent of judicial bias, the concerns have become dire.
But this is not the first time in our nation’s history that concerns
about judicial bias were at the forefront of national conversation.  In
fact, Americans worried about corrupt and biased judges long before
judicial elections became popular.  In the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries, judicial independence and impartiality were
central to the debates leading up to American independence, as well
as the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.  But for our forefa-
thers, the solution was not recusal.180  Instead, the founding genera-
tion looked to the people themselves to check judicial bias.  They
inserted the people directly into the judiciary to control judicial cor-
ruption and bias from within.  The people, serving on juries, would act
to hold judges accountable, and ensure that judges lived up to the
principles of the Constitution.  For them, the jury was the quintessen-
tial bulwark of liberty—a way for ordinary people to stand up to gov-
ernment officials, including judges, and to ensure judicial
impartiality.
A. The Founders’ Fear of Judicial Bias
Although the Founders did not have to worry about judicial elec-
tions,181 they were very concerned about judicial bias and corruption,
and generally distrusted judicial power.  There were a number of
fears—many of which are analogous to modern-day concerns about
election-related judicial bias.  First, eighteenth-century Americans
considered judges to be easily corruptible.  Since judges—at least trial
judges—typically work alone, and there are few of them in most juris-
dictions, they might be bribed or otherwise influenced by those who
appointed them, or by those who appear in front of them.  One wealthy
or powerful litigant who frequently appears in a certain courtroom
could easily approach a judge with a bribe, a threat, or a promise.
Second, Americans feared that judges, as government agents,
might be biased in favor of the government—especially the Executive
180. In fact, recusal was not even required for bias under British common law or at
the time of the founding in the United States.  Recusal was only required when a
judge had a financial interest in the outcome of the case.  Dmitry Bam, Making
Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 BYU L. REV. 943,
952 (discussing the common law recusal standards).
181. Judges were appointed by the governor, the legislature, or both at this time, as
judicial elections did not become popular until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. See supra notes 28–29.
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Branch—not because of corruption but because of human nature.182
This was especially true in criminal cases, as well as civil claims
against government officials, where judges might go easy on their fel-
low government officers.  After all, both the judge and the Executive
official would be on the government’s payroll and might have the same
(governmental) interests at heart.  Pamphlets of the Revolutionary
Era frequently included complaints about judicial partisanship in
favor of other branches of government.183
Third, judges might also be biased in favor of their friends or the
community from which they came.  After all, American judges are typ-
ically prominent individuals, who may have prominent friends.  For
example, Blackstone acknowledged that while judges are presumed to
be impartial, judges “will have frequently an involuntary bias towards
those of their own rank and dignity.”184  Akhil Amar, describing the
Founders’ concerns, explains that “[u]nchecked by a jury, a judge
might be tempted . . . to go easy on his wealthy friends.”185
These fears were not irrational.  Rather, they were based on the
colonists’ experience with the judiciary, both in England and in the
colonies, in the decades leading up to American independence.  For
example, British judges were perceived as frequent allies of tyrannical
government officials, aligned with the government against the peo-
ple.186  In the words of one leading Anti-Federalist, “[A] lordly court of
justice [is] always ready to protect the officers of government against
the weak and helpless citizen.”187  The colonial experience with judges
was often similar.  One of the biggest complaints during the Stamp
Act Crisis in 1765 and 1766, for example, was about judicial bias in
182. Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331,
1341 (2012) (“Citizens could not trust judges to act independently and decide
cases without bias toward the British government.”).
183. See ESSAYS OF AN OLD WHIG (1788), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST 49 (Herbert A. Storing ed., 1981) (“Judges, unencumbered by juries, have
been ever found much better friends to government than to the people.  Such
judges will always be more desirable than juries to [tyrants].”).
184. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
185. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 237 (2005).  This fear of judges was
part of a widespread contempt for lawyers throughout the country during the
Colonial Era.  And judges, as former lawyers, could just as easily “subvert every
principle of law and establish a perfect aristocracy.”  Jeffrey R. Pankratz, Neutral
Principles and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courts, 67 IND. L.J. 1091, 1103
(1991) (citing C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY
LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 191 (1970)).
186. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 87 (1998) (describing “the case of
Prynne and the infamous ‘Bloody Assizes’ of Judge George Jeffreys”), for exam-
ples of a number of high-profile instances in which British judges “abetted gov-
ernment tyranny.”
187. ESSAY OF A DEMOCRATIC FEDERALIST (1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 183, at 61.
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trials for colonists accused of failing to pay new taxes.188  And as Akhil
Amar explains, “In ten of the thirteen colonies, the sitting chief justice
or his equivalent ultimately chose George III over George Washing-
ton” during the Revolution.189  The “intense and widespread anti-
judge sentiment”190 was a common feature of early American law.
Colonists believed that British judges were biased, and their opinion
of colonial judges was not all that different.
These concerns did not dissipate with the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, which offered federal judges life tenure and almost complete judi-
cial independence.  When it came to protecting individual rights and
liberties, judges alone could not—and would not—be trusted.  Even
Article III judges—perhaps the most independent judicial officers in
the world—were thought to be too biased to serve impartially the role
of the gatekeeper.  After all, these judges were appointed by other fed-
eral elected officials191 and may not have the willpower (or the desire)
to stand up to those officials in favor of individual litigants.192  No
matter how independent the judges were, colonists continued to be-
lieve that judges would tend to favor the government, the wealthy,
and their friends over the interests of the common people.193
B. What: The Jury Solution
What was the Founders’ solution to the problem of judicial bias?
Unlike modern-day Americans, they did not trust judges to ensure
their own impartiality through panoply of recusal rules.  In fact, eight-
eenth-century recusal rules did not even apply to biased judges.  Back
then, recusal was required only when a judge had a financial stake in
the outcome of the case.194  Instead, the solution to judicial bias was
installing a check on judges within the judiciary itself.195  And that
188. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 23 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994).
189. AMAR, supra note 185, at 207.
190. Roger Roots, The Rise and Fall of the American Jury, 8 SETON HALL CIRC. REV. 1,
8 (2011).
191. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
192. In fact, this is precisely what happened when Congress passed the Alien and Se-
dition Acts to stifle Republican criticism of the Federalists.  The partisan re-
sponse of the Federalist judges exemplified the Founders’ concerns about judicial
independence and the ability of judges to halt unconstitutional governmental
action.
193. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
105 (1967).
194. See Bam, supra note 180, at 952 (discussing the common law recusal standards).
195. Of course, the jury would also serve as a check on legislative and executive au-
thority. See Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-
Finding Traditions on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN
ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700–1900, at 41, 61 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed.,
1987) (discussing the role of the jury as a surrogate for what was “viewed as a
corrupt and unrepresentative parliament”).
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role was entrusted to the juries.  As much as Americans in the late-
eighteenth century distrusted judges, they revered juries.  One of the
main reasons for this reverence was that it gave people the power to
check corruption within the judicial branch.196  While we typically
think of the criminal trial jury as an “essential part of the English
government [and] a necessary counter to governmental authority,”197
this was no less true of civil juries.198  “For many purposes until the
nineteenth century the civil and criminal jury were insepara-
ble . . . .”199  Colonial supporters of the jury strongly believed that the
right of trial by jury in civil cases was an important bulwark against
tyranny and corruption, and would serve as a check on corrupt and
biased judges.200  In the early years of this nation “the jury came to be
viewed as an essential counterbalance to the threat of excessive judi-
cial power.”201
The right to a trial by jury was central in the American campaign
for independence.  The deprivation of that right was one of the causes
of the American Revolution.202  A key charge against the King in the
Declaration of Independence was that he deprived the colonists “of the
benefits of Trial by Jury.”203  Indeed, the right to a jury trial was the
only right protected in every state constitution of the founding era.204
196. See BAILYN, supra note 193, at 73–76.
197. Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand
Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the
States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2014).
198. Solomon, supra note 182, at 1340 (“Historically, the civil jury in the United
States, like the criminal jury, was justified in large part as a check against the
abuse of government power.”).
199. John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French
Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 1700–1900, supra
note 195, at 13, 15.
200. Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Sev-
enth Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 150–53
(1991).
201. Stephen H. Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 23 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
202. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868 (2006) (discussing American outrage over
Parliament’s creation of juryless courts to adjudicate certain cases).
203. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776).  Other Revolutionary
Era documents, including the 1774 Declaration of Rights of the First Continental
Congress and the 1775 Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up
Arms, also listed the denial of the right to a jury trial as a grievance against the
British government. AMAR, supra note 186, at 83.
204. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870–71 (1994).  In fact, not only did the
constitutions of all original colonies guarantee the right to a jury trial, but every
state that entered the union after the ratification of the Constitution did so with
a constitution the protected the right in criminal cases. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
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The right to a jury trial was also important in the debates sur-
rounding the adoption of the Constitution.205  In fact, when the origi-
nal draft of the Constitution failed to include the right to a jury trial in
civil cases, the opposition to the omission almost derailed the entire
project.206  Although the Constitution was ultimately ratified, seven
states’ ratifying conventions specifically conditioned ratification on a
future amendment guaranteeing the right to jury trial in civil
cases.207  Once again, the jury’s power to “check the caprice of biased
judges” was at the forefront of the colonists’ minds.208  In the words of
the Federal Farmer, juries “secure to the people at large their just and
rightful control in the judicial department.”209  According to James
Madison, the jury would provide a check on governmental power, giv-
ing the people direct control over elements of government.210  Alexan-
der Hamilton also saw the jury as “security against corruption.”211  By
inserting the people directly into the judiciary, the people would play a
direct role in the administration of justice and in protecting the people
from government overreach.212  Historians and legal scholars, from de
Tocquevile to Akhil Amar, have written volumes emphasizing the
jury’s role as a check on governmental agents.213
As is often the case, the writings of Thomas Jefferson reflect the
sentiment of the time.  In a letter to the Abbe´ Arnoux in 1789, Thomas
Jefferson also focused on the jury as an antidote to the problem of
judicial bias.  Jefferson argued:
[Judges may be] misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a
devotion to the Executive or Legislative . . . . It is left therefore to the juries, if
205. AMAR, supra note 185, at 233–35.
206. Id.; see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITU-
TION, 1787–1788 (2010) (discussing Anti-Federalist arguments against the Con-
stitution based on its failure to protect jury trials); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE
STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26, 265
(1996) (same).
207. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury”); id. at amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved . . . .”).
208. Stacey P. Eilbaum, The Dual Face of the American Jury, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 711,
717 (2013).
209. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 183, at 19.
210. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James
Madison).
211. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
212. Letter from Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 53
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“It is essential in every free coun-
try, that common people should have a part and share of influence in the judicial
as well as in the legislative department.”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to the Abbe´ Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 363, 364
(“[I]t is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government.”).
213. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966); AMAR, supra note 186, at 73–76, 87.
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they think the permanent judges are under any biass [sic] whatever in any
cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the fact.  Were I
called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legisla-
tive or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the
Legislative.214
In discussing the importance of the jury to democratic government,
Anti-Federalists emphasized that in a dispute between a citizen and a
federal officer, a judge would likely be biased in favor of the govern-
ment official rather than the “helpless citizen.”215  The jury, the argu-
ment went, would serve as an equalizer—a way around biased judges.
The fact that judges in most states are now elected, rather than ap-
pointed, only increases the importance of the jury as a check.
The Supreme Court, too, has recognized that checking against judi-
cial bias was one of the key functions of the jury when it incorporated
the right to a jury trial against the states.  In Duncan v. Louisiana,
the Court explained that “[t]hose who wrote our constitutions knew
from history and experience that it was necessary to pro-
tect . . . against judges too responsive to the voice of higher author-
ity.”216  The jury was “an expression of American concerns about
judicial independence.”217
C. Why: The Advantages of the Jury
Of course there are a number of reasons for why the Founders re-
vered the jury,218 many of which had nothing to do with judicial bias.
But specifically with respect to judicial bias, why was the jury their
chosen mechanism to control biased judges?  The Founders were not
so naı¨ve as to believe that juries were perfect or that jurors cannot be
subject to biases.  Rather, they viewed the jury as part of the checks
and balances scheme that they created in the Constitution.  Just as
the House and the Senate might check each other, the lay jurors
might act as a “counterpoise” to a professional judiciary.219
214. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbe´ Arnoux, supra note 212, at 364.
215. A Democratic Federalist, PENN. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE FOUN-
DERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 212, at 393.
216. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
217. Landsman, supra note 201, at 23.
218. For example, the Founders emphasized the educational function that the jury
might serve, allowing people to become educated of the laws under which they
live.  In addition, the jury might be able to reach a more just result, even if the
judge is not biased.  There is a long line of literature describing these justifica-
tions for the jury. See, e.g., J. KENDALL FEW, IN DEFENSE OF TRIAL BY JURY
(1994); WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS,
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002). The jury was
also the voice of the community. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 213.  Finally, be-
cause there were many jurors, the jury might actually serve to act as a more
accurate decision-maker.
219. See ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 37–65 (1961).
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First, unlike judges, who could be easily corrupted, jurors would be
a much more difficult target.  In fact, in the eighteenth century, a
number of colonists argued in favor of the jury motivated precisely by
this fear of corruption.220  Elbridge Gerry, for example, “urged the ne-
cessity of Juries to guard [against] corrupt Judges.”221  The reasons
are obvious: because judges were known well in advance of trial, they
would be much easier to approach and corrupt than a jury.  As Black-
stone observed, the jury is “not appointed till the hour of trial.”222  In
addition, it would take a lot more effort and resources to corrupt a
large body, like the jury, than a single judge.
Second, the jury was and continues to be made up of ordinary citi-
zens who are not on the government payroll.  The jury thus would not
be subject to many of the biases that sway judges.  That is true even
for life-tenured federal judges, who “depend upon their role for their
livelihood.”223  The Founders recognized “the corruptions of power and
the temptations of office” that judicial appointments would bring.224
They were concerned largely that those judges would owe a debt of
gratitude to their former benefactors (i.e., the President and the Con-
gressmen that appointed them).  For jurors, who came to their office
for a single case and would afterwards return to their normal life af-
terwards, there were far fewer temptations.  Jurors, unlike judges,
were not “dependent on the executive for money and position.”225
They owed their job to no one and would have to answer to no one for
their decisions.226  Since the agreement of both branches of the judici-
ary (the people and the judges) would be required to reach a final ver-
220. Paul K. Sun, Jr., Congressional Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Federal
Agencies and the Right to Trial by Jury, 1988 DUKE L.J. 539, 557 (1988) (“The
Framers recognized that at least one function of the seventh amendment was to
protect individual litigants against corrupt judges . . . .”).
221. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 369
(2009) (quoting Notes of James Madison (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 585, 587 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
222. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380; David F. Partlett, The Republican
Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409, 1423 (2004) (“[The
jury’s] shifting and impermanent composition restricts the ability of powerful fac-
tions and government from suborning the judicial process.”).
223. See Teachout, supra note 221, at 369.
224. WILLIAM EATON, WHO KILLED THE CONSTITUTION?: THE JUDGES V. THE LAW 3
(1988).
225. Thomas, supra note 197, at 1202 (citing THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT AC-
CORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY,
1200–1800, at 334 (1985)).
226. Of course, this raises its own concerns.  One of the major criticisms of civil juries,
for example, is the fact that they do not have to explain their decisions, and the
decisions they reach are often irrational or based on passion and prejudice.  My
proposal of a Hybrid Judicial Panel addresses, at least partially, such concerns
because jurors would have to deliberate alongside judges and would likely feel
obliged to explain their reasoning to the trial judge. See infra Part IV.
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dict, biased judges alone would be powerless to impose their biases on
the people.227
Not only would jurors have no biases in favor of the government,
they would not be biased in favor of a specific class or set of friends.
Whereas a judge might have certain bonds with the powerful or the
wealthy, the jury, as a group, would remain impartial and indepen-
dent.  As William Blackstone explained, “[T]he most powerful individ-
ual in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of
another’s right, when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be
examined and decided by twelve indifferent men.”228  In fact, the
Founders recognized that judicial bias might even be involuntary.
Again, in Blackstone’s influential words:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and
our properties, is the great end of civil society.  But if that be entirely en-
trusted to [judges], their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will
have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and
dignity.229
Another important reason why the Founders believed in the jury is
that they had experienced first-hand the jury’s ability to stand up to
judges who were perceived to be biased.  By the late-eighteenth cen-
tury, the jury had developed a reputation of standing up to power, in-
cluding judicial power.  Two incidents had a particularly profound
influence on Americans of the eighteenth century, shaping their views
about the role of the jury.  First was the jury’s refusal to convict
Quakers William Penn and William Mead.230  The two men were pros-
ecuted for preaching in public.  The jury faced strong judicial pressure,
and when the jury refused to convict, the judge fined and jailed the
jurors.  One of the jurors, Edward Bushel, sought habeas corpus, and
the Court of Common Pleas held that jailing or fining the jurors was
improper.  A similar incident took place two decades later, when an-
other London jury acquitted seven bishops of sedition libel, again in
the face of judicial pressure.231
The colonial experience was shaped by a similar incident.  When
John Peter Zenger, who had accused the Governor of New York of cor-
227. Cf. Letter from Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 212, at 397, 397 (explaining that if judges were to “subvert the
law,” then the jury would “check them by deciding against their opinions and
determinations.” (punctuation omitted)).  Again, this is analogous to the Foun-
ders’ design for the federal legislature, where both the lower and the upper
houses must agree to pass a law. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
228. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.
229. Id. at *379.
230. For a brief summary of William Penn’s trial and the subsequent events, see Scott
Turow, Best Trial; Order in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 1999), http://
www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/magazine/best-trial-order-in-the-court.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/M4JZ-E2ST.
231. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 14–30 (2003).
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ruption, was charged with seditious libel in 1735, the judge instructed
the jury to convict Zenger if it found that he had published the state-
ment in question.  There was no question that he had done so.  But
Zenger’s lawyers argued that the jury could find in favor of Zenger
even if conviction was required by the judge’s instructions.  Zenger
was acquitted, and to the Founders, the case stood for the proposition
that jurors could defend fundamental rights even when judges were
unlikely to do so.232
In fact, the seditious libel cases are a perfect example of the jury at
work checking judicial bias.  Only two people were convicted under the
law in America during the colonial period, while hundreds of defend-
ants were convicted of the same crime in England.233  The main rea-
son was that even when judges were sympathetic to the law, grand
juries refused to indict individuals of the crime, and when they did,
petit juries refused to convict.
The bias concerns arising out of elections are parallel to those that
the Founders were worried about.  The Founders were worried that
judges would be biased to government and wealthy friends.  The elec-
tion-related concerns are almost identical; judges are biased in favor
of their donors and in favor of the partisan preferences of the voters.
The Founders were worried that it would be easier to bribe a perma-
nent judge than temporary jurors.  Although bribery might still hap-
pen, it is more likely targeted at a judge than used to influence the
jury.
The jury, as the “lower house” of the judiciary, is not subject to the
same biasing influences as judges.  Take money, for example.  While
wealthy individuals contribute money to judges, they cannot do so
with juries without violating state and federal bribery laws.234  Unlike
an elected judge, the jury can stand up to the influence of money, the
fear of losing an election, or concern about breaking campaign
promises.  And although an elected judge might be reasonably nervous
about how the public will react to his or her decision in a future elec-
tion, jurors have no such worries, because they are the public, and
they are one-shot players with no need to maintain the job.  Jurors
need not be afraid of how a wealthy corporation will react to their deci-
sions or how their decisions will appear to future voters.
232. Id. at 24.
233. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 17 (1985).
234. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“As there is always more time
and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a
jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose that a corrupt influence
would more easily find its way to the former than to the latter.”).
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D. How: Giving Juries the Power to Act as a Check
The Founders’ reliance on the jury was not merely theoretical or
rhetorical.  The jury in fact had the power and the tools to check
judges.  What made the jury such an effective check on judicial bias?
There are two major reasons.
First, there were lots of jury trials.235  American colonists sought
to “channel as much judicial business as possible” into juried court-
rooms.236  Most civil cases, at least cases involving damages, were
tried to a jury.237  Settlement was fairly uncommon—arbitration even
less so—which means that the most important decisions in the case
were made by jurors.
Perhaps most importantly, there were few devices allowing judges
to decide cases on motions without the input or involvement of the
jury.  Before trial, on a procedure called the demurrer to the plead-
ings, a litigant could admit all the facts as stated by the opposing
side.238  This procedure is somewhat akin to the modern Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, but a demurrer was a risky proposition for a litigant.  If the
defendant lost the motion, then the plaintiff won the case since the
defendant had admitted all the facts.239  As a result, these motions
were rarely brought or granted.240
But if the defendant did not file a demurrer motion and the plain-
tiff did not voluntarily drop the case (a procedure called a nonsuit),241
the case would go to the jury.  The judge could not grant judgment in
favor of one of the parties because, in the judge’s opinion, the facts
seemed unlikely or implausible, or because the judge concluded that
no reasonable jury would rule in favor of a litigant.  That was the
jury’s decision.  If, after trial, the judge was convinced that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, he could order a
new trial.242  But ultimately, it was the jury who decided which party
should win, and how much should be awarded in damages.  Judges
235. See James Oldham, Law-Making at Nisi Prius in the Early 1800s, 25 J. LEGAL
HIST. 221, 226 (2004); Thomas, supra note 197, at 1209 (“[M]any jury trials
occurred.”).
236. AMAR, supra note 186, at 110.
237. Under English common law, the jury heard all cases involving damages while
equity court judges decided issues involving equitable relief, including specific
performance and injunctions.  Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In
Suits at Common Law,” 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 1084–96 (2010).
238. See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the En-
glish Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 706–07.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 709, 712.
241. Id. at 722–25.
242. If the second jury agreed with the first, a third trial was rarely ordered.  3 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *387.
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had no fact-finding power, and the jury could play an active role with
virtually no judicial interference.243
Not only was the jury able to act as a check on biased judges in
making its decision, but its mere presence served a watch-dog func-
tion.  With the jury constantly monitoring judicial behavior, and per-
haps reporting their observations to fellow citizens, judges would
think twice before engaging in corrupt or biased behavior.  That is one
big benefit of jury trials: they require judges to act openly and pub-
licly.  In fact, some have argued that the court-watching function is
the core interest of the jury system.244
Another important reason why the jury was able to act as a check
on judicial bias was the scope of the jury’s power when those trials
took place.  The jury of our Founders had a significant law-finding
power.  The jury’s power of “jury review”—the ability to acquit a de-
fendant who was charged under what the jury deemed to be an uncon-
stitutional law—was at the core of the jury’s powers.  The Supreme
Court (in Georgia v. Brailsford) held that this law-finding power was
one of the rights of the jury.245  In fact, some state constitutions ex-
pressly provided for the jury’s law-finding power.  The language of
Georgia’s constitution exemplifies this approach: “The jury shall be
judges of law, as well as of fact.”246  James Wilson, one of the leading
drafters of our Federal Constitution, wrote that the jury is “the ulti-
mate interpreter[ ] of the law.”247  Any other approach, according to
John Adams, would be an “absurdity.”248
The power that the common law jury wielded was much more than
the mere ability to engage in jury nullification, a power that exists to
243. Incidentally, the same pattern holds true when it comes to criminal cases.  At
around the time of the founding, there was little plea bargaining.  Pleas were
atypical, and plea bargaining was viewed with suspicion.  Alschuler & Deiss,
supra note 204, at 923–24.  Nearly every prisoner demanded a jury trial, without
countervailing pressure by the court. J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN
ENGLAND: 1660–1800, at 336–37 (1986) (discussing the prevalence of jury trials in
criminal cases and a lack of support for plea bargaining).  There were no trials by
judge alone as a trial without the jury was seen as illegitimate. See Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (holding that a defendant cannot waive the right to a
trial by jury).
244. Daniel J. Kopp, Note, A Constitutional Right of Access to Pretrial Documents: A
Missed Opportunity in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 62 IND. L.J.
735, 748–49 (1987) (discussing the importance of public monitoring of judges).
245. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (“Gentlemen, . . . you have . . . a right to
take upon yourselves . . . to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy.”).
246. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. IX.
247. AMAR, supra note 186, at 100 (quoting 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 221
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)).
248. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 254 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850) (explaining
that the jury should disregard the judge’s instructions on the law if such instruc-
tions were “against [the jury’s] own opinion, judgment, and conscience”).
904 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:862
this day.  Rather, the jury had a legal right, and a moral right, to
judge both law and fact.  Lawyers frequently argued the law to the
jury.  And many commentators of the time agreed that the jury has
the duty to find both the law and the facts.249  This power lays largely
in the jury’s ability to render a general verdict.250
IV. RESURRECTING THE JURY
Part III showed that at the time of the founding, the civil jury was
the primary check on judicial bias in civil litigation.  But today, the
idea that the civil jury can check judicial bias makes little sense.  The
reason is that the civil jury is virtually dead.
A. The Decline of the Jury
What has happened to the jury?  Despite its prominent role in
American history, the civil jury has been essentially eliminated as a
major player in our justice system.  Recall that the primary reason
that the jury was able to perform its bias-checking function at com-
mon law was because jury trials were common.  Today, jury trials
make up less than 1% of all state court civil disposition.251  Few law-
yers, even litigators, ever see the inside of the courtroom.  In a span of
two centuries we have gone from trials in almost all civil cases involv-
ing damages, to almost none.  The decline began in the nineteenth
century.252  Throughout the nineteenth century, authority and power
shifted away from the jury and to judges.  Judges, the government
agents whom the jury was intended to check, and corporate interests,
the people to whom judges were feared to be indebted, systematically
removed the most fundamental judicial decisions from the jury’s
hands and moved them into the hands of the judge.253
249. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV.
582, 583 (1939).
250. See AMAR, supra note 186, at 100–01; William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power
of Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1005 (2010).
251. See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 768 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance
of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012).  Once again, the
trend is almost identical in the criminal context.  At the time of the founding, the
criminal jury heard almost every serious criminal case.  Now, approximately 95%
of criminal defendants plead guilty.  Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91–100
(2005).
252. Notes and Comments, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century,
74 YALE L.J. 170, 170–71 (1964).
253. It is not just judges who have sapped the jury’s power.  The passage of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, as well as recent Supreme Court decisions favoring arbitra-
tion, have made it significantly less likely that a jury will ever get to hear a
dispute between a powerful corporate entity and a harmed individual. See Rent-
A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (holding that an arbitrator,
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There are a number of reasons for this transformation.  On occa-
sion, the jury’s power has been transferred to other tribunals—often
arbitrators.254  In addition, because the Supreme Court has not incor-
porated the Seventh Amendment against the states, most states do
not require juries for cases involving smaller amounts of money, do-
mestic relations cases, and a number of other disputes.255  Further-
more, many state and federal rules of procedure now heavily promote
settlement, requiring the parties to engage in frequent settlement and
mediation conferences, often supervised by the trial judge who may
place pressure on the parties to settle.256
But the most important force that has led to the disappearance of
the civil jury is the creation and development of procedural tools that
allow the judge, rather than the jury, to act as the primary decision-
maker (and fact-finder) in many cases.  Giving this power to a judge—
especially a judge who may be biased in favor of one of the parties—is
problematic, and eliminates the most important check on judicial bias.
It allows the judge to decide the case behind closed doors, without any
neutral observer overseeing the judicial decision.  There are three key
dispositive motions that define modern civil litigation.  None of the
three existed at common law, and all three significantly enhanced ju-
dicial power at the expense of the jury.
The first is the power to dismiss the case upon a defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss.  By granting a motion to dismiss, the judge is able to
terminate a case if he concludes that the alleged facts do not state a
claim on which relief may be granted.257  At first glance, this appears
rather than the court, has the power to decide whether an entire agreement con-
taining an arbitration agreement is unconscionable); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts state law
prohibiting waiver of access to a class action in an arbitration agreement).  For a
discussion of this issue, see Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role
in the Structure of Our Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1258–59
(2014).
254. Because parties agree to arbitration contracts “voluntarily” and arbitrators are
not elected, this shift does not raise the same bias concerns that were discussed
in Part II.
255. See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 172–75 (2012); LESTER WALLMAN & LAWRENCE
J. SCHWARZ, HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW 291–92 (1989).  Only Texas appears to
allow for jury trials in child custody and other family matters.  Kevin Gick,
“Twelve Mommies and Daddies, Not a Scary Judge Clad in Black”: Why Does
Only One State Let Juries Decide Child Custody Cases?, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 612,
617 (2005).
256. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982).
257. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Discussion of Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations, 88 A.L.I. PROC. 258, 258 (2011) (“Every state has its
rules on motions to dismiss . . . .”).  Most states modeled their local rules pursuant
to the federal rules and, therefore, have a correlative rule to Federal Rule
12(b)(6). See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Barbara Arco, When Rights Collide:
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to be a purely legal decision.  And, before the modern evolution of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, this was not much of a threat for a plaintiff.
The case would be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.”258  Just as with the motion for demurrer under
common law,259 the motion to dismiss was rarely brought because
most cases were sufficiently pled to survive this stage.260  But in re-
cent years, the Supreme Court has made it easier for trial judges to
dismiss cases if they determine, using “judicial experience and com-
mon sense,” that the claim is implausible.261  While some states have
rejected the federal standard, others have followed suit,262 making a
motion to dismiss an important stage in litigation and leaving the
trial judge, rather than the jury, as the decision-maker in a large
number of cases.263
The second, and probably most important, procedure that has led
to the decline of the jury is the motion for summary judgment.  Once
again, summary judgment gives the judge an opportunity to dismiss a
claim before a jury has a chance to get involved.  In recent years, sum-
mary judgment has become a docket-clearing mechanism for many
judges.264  But even worse, summary judgment allows a judge to rely
on his view of the evidence, without any oversight, to reach whatever
result the judge desires.265  Many scholars have observed that judges
are essentially making factual determinations under some legal
guise.266  Today, summary judgment is the most important tool that
judges use to take cases away from jury.  Not only was there nothing
Reconciling the First Amendment Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation,
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 600 n.88 (1998).
258. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
259. See discussion supra Part III.
260. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dis-
miss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 24 (2010).
261. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007); see generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 551, 554–62 (2002) (discussing the history of Rule 8 and the liberal plead-
ing standard of the federal rules).
262. E.g., Iannachino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008) (adopting
Twombly’s standard).
263. See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008).
264. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliche´s Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
265. This is particularly true following the 1986 “summary judgment trilogy” that
made the summary judgment standard much easier to meet for movants. See
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1904
(1998).
266. Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993)
(discussing how summary judgment allows judges to act as fact-finders).
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like it at common law, but fact-finding was considered one of the most
important functions of the jury.267  And in the criminal context, the
Supreme Court has held that when a judge takes fact-finding author-
ity away from the jury, the defendant is deprived the right to a jury
trial.  But judges in civil cases do this every day.  In some cases, in-
cluding many involving civil rights claims, a number of judges over-
whelmingly grant summary judgment in a majority of cases, even in
those involving numerous disputed factual issues.268  Of the three
procedures listed, summary judgment appears to be the biggest cul-
prit behind the decline of civil jury trials.269
The third procedure, one that is substantively similar to summary
judgment, is judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).  With JMOL, just
as with summary judgment, the judge decides whether a reasonable
jury could find for the nonmoving party.270  The judge can even grant
such a motion after a jury finds in favor of nonmoving party.  But
rather than merely having the power to grant a new trial and allowing
a new jury decide the case, as a judge was able to do under common
law,271 the judge can now, alone, dismiss the case based on the judge’s
own opinion of the evidence.
A non-dispositive procedure that nonetheless enables a biased
judge to aid a favored litigant in the face of the jury’s verdict is the
remittitur of damages.  Historically, juries have had the power to set
damages.272  In recent years, some of that power has been taken
away, protecting corporate defendants from “excessive” punitive dam-
ages.  In a long line of cases,273 the Supreme Court held that due pro-
cess limits the amount of damages that a jury can award.  By
characterizing punitive damages as questions of law rather than ques-
267. See also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (finding unconstitutional
Washington’s mandatory sentencing guidelines that permitted judges to increase
a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum if the judge found that the
defendant acted with deliberate cruelty).
268. M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judg-
ments, 8 S. CAL. REV. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311 (1999).
269. See David H. Simmons, Stephen J. Jacobs, Daniel J. O’Malley & Richard H.
Tami, The Celotex Trilogy Revisited: How Misapplication of the Federal Sum-
mary Judgment Standard Is Undermining the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial, 1 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (“[C]ourts are impermissibly
weighing evidence, construing inferences in favor of the moving party, and mak-
ing credibility determinations that deny litigants the ability to reach trial and
thereby obstruct litigants from their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.”).
270. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
271. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 379 (1913).
272. See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (holding that it is well-settled
that “where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar
function of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict”).
273. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc.  v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
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tions of fact,274 these holdings shift a key power away from the jury
and into the hands of the professional judiciary.  To make matters
worse, if a judge decides that damages are excessive, the court can
order that damages be reduced.275
All of these procedures give the judge the power to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence and act as fact-finders.276  As discussed
earlier, this was a not a power that judges had under the common law
and at the time of the founding.  With so few cases going to trial, the
people rarely have an opportunity to perform the heroic functions in-
tended for the jury.  And as a result, the key mechanism for holding
biased judges accountable has faded into oblivion.
B. A Twenty-First-Century Jury: The Hybrid Judicial Panel
So what is the solution?  After all, despite significant scholarly crit-
icism of these modern procedures, they, like judicial elections, are un-
likely to go away.  Not only are they engrained in modern civil
litigation, but it is unclear whether the justice system can ever return
to trial-centered approach where most cases go to trial.  Thus, while a
proposal to reverse the clock and return to the common law civil proce-
dure is the easiest one to make, it is highly unlikely to be
implemented.
But what if, rather than bringing civil litigation back into the
eighteenth century, we brought the jury into the twenty-first?  After
all, it is not modern civil procedure that needs to be updated, but our
outdated approach to when the jury gets involved in the case.  If mod-
ern civil litigation revolves around pretrial motion practice—including
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of
law—then perhaps the jury can be integrated into pretrial practice.
Jurors can serve alongside judges on mixed pretrial courts, deciding
key procedural motions that are now made by judges alone.  The ju-
rors would be selected from a jury pool, like we use today, and
screened by judges to ensure that they are not biased.  But rather
than waiting until trial to empanel a jury, a mini-jury can be em-
paneled early in the case.  These Panels, which I call Hybrid Judicial
Panels, integrate the jury into modern litigation, allowing jurors to
serve as a check on judicial bias, and give the people a voice at the
points where we know judicial bias has the potential to be at its peak.
274. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (treating
punitive damages as questions of law).
275. In this situation, the court must give the plaintiff an option of a new trial. See
Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299
(1976).
276. See Thomas, supra note 263, at 251; ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL
JURY 288–94 (2001).
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Take the motion for summary judgment.  The use of summary
judgment has increased dramatically over the last few decades.277  As
explained earlier, when a judge grants summary judgment, the judge
makes what is ultimately a factual determination: a judge decides how
a reasonable jury would see the facts, and this perception may be
colored by the judge’s conscious or subconscious biases.278  As a num-
ber of scholars have pointed out, “[I]t is clear that courts have used
summary judgment to dismiss many . . . factually intensive cases.”279
By reserving key decision-making to themselves, judges have excluded
the jurors from the process.  That’s why many Seventh Amendment
scholars have argued that summary judgment violates the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial.280
Now consider my proposal.  Rather than permitting the judge
alone to decide whether the facts are sufficient for a reasonable jury to
find in favor of the nonmoving party,281 the judge and a group of ju-
rors (perhaps as few as two) would consider the motion together.  The
judge could not single-handedly end the case.  If the defendant was a
key contributor to a judge’s election campaign, then a judge could not
grant summary judgment in the defendant’s favor without convincing
at least one lay person—a juror—that summary judgment should be
granted.  And in order to convince that juror, the judge would have to
explain why the law is on the defendant’s side.
While the idea of judges and jurors working together to decide pre-
trial motions may seem unusual to us, there are a number of jurisdic-
tions throughout the world that have adopted the use of similar mixed
courts, albeit in different context.  The most well-known instances of
mixed-court use are in France, Germany, and Japan.  All three na-
tions allow lay judges (akin to American jurors) to serve alongside pro-
fessional judges in serious criminal cases, and the German system in
particular has been the subject of numerous articles.282  In fact, as the
277. See Miller, supra note 264, at 984 (noting that summary judgment has been
transformed from an infrequently granted procedural tool to a powerful pretrial
device for early resolution).
278. See McGinley, supra note 266.
279. Thomas, supra note 197, at 1226.
280. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a
Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); Arthur R.
Miller, supra note 264, at 1060 (“The right to a jury trial is at stake on both
summary judgment and directed verdict motions.”).
281. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
282. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Compara-
tive Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 462 (1997) (noting
that France, Italy, and Germany employ mixed courts consisting of lay and pro-
fessional judges); Rene´e Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An
American on Trial for an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 791, 823 (“[I]n France there is no separate sentencing hearing as in a
typical American court.”); see also John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt
910 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:862
jury system has fallen into disrepute throughout the world,283 the use
of mixed courts has evolved in its place.284  Even in the United States,
some commentators have suggested “experimentation with combina-
tions of laymen and professional judges.”285
Admittedly, not much has been written about the use of a mixed
panel during the pretrial phases, as I am suggesting here.  And I have
been unable to find any nation or jurisdiction that extensively allows
jurors to work together with judges to decide pretrial motions like the
motion to dismiss or the motion for summary judgment.286  Nonethe-
less, there is no reason why such a panel would not be feasible in the
United States.  Our courts have access to a large number of potential
jurors.  But because less than 1% of the cases actually get to a jury
trial, these jury pools are often unused.  And because many of the deci-
sions made by judges in deciding motions for summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law are factual in nature, there is nothing
unusual about asking jurors to help the judge make those decisions.
While there are many benefits associated with mixed courts in
other nations, I want to focus in particular on how such a Panel once
again restores the ability of the people to act as a check on judicial
bias.  A Hybrid Judicial Panel immediately offers a check on judicial
bias because lay judges would outnumber professional, elected judges.
Just as we saw earlier with the jury, the mere presence of the jury
may lead a judge to act in a more impartial manner.287  More impor-
tantly, the judge would have to deliberate with the jurors, explaining
to them why he believes summary judgment should be granted or de-
nied.288  Because the judge’s decision would, in a sense, be public, it is
the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L REV. 987, 987 (1990) (dis-
cussing mixed courts in Germany).
283. Almost no nation in the world uses juries in civil litigation.  Charles S. Desmond,
Current Problems of State Court Administration, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 565
(1965) (“[O]urs is the only major country in the world using civil juries . . . .”).
284. John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alterna-
tive Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195.
285. Justin A. Stanley, The Resolution of Minor Disputes and the Seventh Amendment,
60 MARQ. L. REV. 963, 971 (1977)
286. In Germany, mixed courts appear to be used in a small number of specialized
court cases. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 865 (1985).
287. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380.
288. Some have argued that independent jury deliberation increases the ability of lay
judges to check a biased professional judge.  Markus Dirk Dubber, The German
Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 257 (1995) (“The collaborative model, of course, did not carve
out an area of independent deliberation for the lay participants and therefore
limited the lay participants’ ability to check the bias of the professional judges.”).
This may be true, but the inclusion of jurors in the deliberation is better than the
status quo, with the judge deciding key dispositive motions without any layper-
son involvement.
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unlikely that the judge would offer, as a reason, that the defendant is
an in-state litigant likely to support his reelection bid.  And just like
jurors of the past few centuries, the panelists would not be beholden to
any special interest group or an especially valuable campaign contrib-
utor.  Of course, merely including lay judges in the deliberation does
not alone guarantee an impartial adjudication; the risk of bias is re-
duced if only because the different biases and interests are balanced
against each other.289
The Hybrid Judicial Panel does more than just reduce the likeli-
hood that the professional judge will exercise his bias during the most
important phase of the adjudicatory process.  In fact, “[T]he mixed
jury system would afford the professional judges and laypersons with
the opportunity to share their knowledge and experience through ef-
fective communications.”290  Jury participation in pretrial motions
will lead to more robust deliberation, and may lead to better results, a
higher quality of justice, and a better understanding of the facts.291
Because a decision by a Hybrid Judicial Panel would be a decision of
3–5 people, rather than a single judge, it is less likely to be the result
of bias and more likely to be anti-dictatorial.292  The increased num-
ber of participants, and increased diversity, would likely make Panel
decisions more accurate than those made by a single jurist.293
C. The Best of Both Worlds: Check on the Jury
And that’s not all!  Not only does the Panel provide protection
against judicial bias, but it also addresses the three major criticisms of
the jury system.  The jury’s decline is partly due to three major criti-
ques of the jury: that the jury is incompetent, biased, and inefficient.
There is a rich body of literature both attacking the jury and defend-
ing it from these critiques.294  I would like to conclude by explaining
how the Hybrid Judicial Panel can address these critiques as well.
One of the most prominent complaints about the civil jury is that
the jurors are incapable of understanding the complex issues that are
289. ABRAMSON, supra note 188, at 99–141.
290. Antoinette Plogstedt, Citizen Judges in Japan: A Report Card for the Initial
Three Years, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 393 (2013) (“This hybrid system
would inject public sentiment and common sense, eliminate judicial bias, and im-
prove civic education.”).
291. See Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering the Public, Pre-
serving Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 155–56 (2009) (discussing how
the Japanese jury system has secured these advantages).
292. See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 247, at 222.
293. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN
THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES,
AND NATIONS (2004).
294. See, e.g., VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 201; STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995).
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central to modern civil and criminal litigation.  Civil cases often re-
quire the understanding of sophisticated technology, complex machin-
ery, or complicated products.  But jurors, the argument goes, have no
training or knowledge in any of these fields.295  To make matters
worse, the selection process has been criticized for producing a jury of
limited intellectual ability and sophistication.296  As a result jurors
are potentially swayed by appeals made to prejudice or emotion and
may be unable to evaluate the evidence placed before them.297  And as
laws, and jury instructions, have become more complex, these criti-
cisms of the jury have grown.
To make matters worse, we rarely know why a jury did what it did.
Juries do not give reasons for their decisions, and their deliberations
are usually secret.  We don’t know whether the jury simply ignored
the law and the facts.  These concerns lead to another one: lack of pre-
dictability.  Different juries reach different conclusions in seemingly
identical cases.  In recent years, juries have received negative public-
ity because of some surprising verdicts.298  While some of these com-
plaints may be overblown—studies seem to show that juries decide
cases similar to judges,299 and judges generally praise jury perform-
ance—there is certainly some truth to all of them.
The Hybrid Judicial Panel addresses many of these critiques.  If
the trained professional judge is indeed more competent to resolve the
complex factual dispute between two litigants, the judge can share his
knowledge with the jury, educating the jurors in the process.  Rather
than leaving jurors alone to understand the vagaries of patents or
medical technology, the judge can guide the discussion of these issues
to the extent they are relevant to deciding a summary judgment mo-
295. But cf. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1174 (2001) (discussing the jury’s ability to understand
complex trial evidence).
296. Albert W. Alschuler, Explaining the Public Wariness of Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
407, 408 (1998) (“The public who serve as jurors are less educated than the
norm . . . .” (emphasis added)).
297. See id.
298. Perhaps the most famous case involved a large verdict awarded to a woman
burned by her McDonald’s coffee. See Stuart Pfeifer, L.A. Woman Sues McDon-
ald’s Over Hot Coffee, 20 Years After Huge Verdict, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/09/business/la-fi-mo-la-woman-sues-
mcdonalds-over-hot-coffee-20-years-after-huge-verdict-20140109, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/SVJ9-7P76 (“[A] jury awarded $2.9 million to a woman who
was badly burned after she spilled hot coffee into her lap at a McDonald’s in
Albuquerque.  That verdict was widely criticized and became a rallying cry for
advocates of legal reform.”).
299. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–64 (1966) (concluding
that judges and juries reach similar decisions around 80% of the time); Larry
Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 46–49 (1994) (presenting similar
conclusions).
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tion or a motion to dismiss.  This allows jurors to learn about judges
and the law, and that has historically been seen as an important func-
tion of the jury system.300  In fact, the “jury was in part an intermedi-
ate association designed to educate and socialize its members into
virtuous thinking and conduct.”301
Even though jurors would outnumber judges on the Panel, it is un-
likely that jurors would simply ignore the judge’s views.  Quite to the
contrary.  Judges will be popularly elected political figures, and they
would exercise some influence over their co-panelists.  In fact, this was
true even under the common law jury system.  Judges were frequently
highly respected local figures who could hold sway over their neigh-
bors and acquaintances serving as jurors.302  Even during the time
when the jury had the power to determine both law and fact, Thomas
Jefferson recognized that jurors often deferred to the judge on ques-
tions of law, using its law-finding functions in cases involving “biased
judges.”303  Studies have shown that a jury foreperson holds signifi-
cant sway over jury deliberations,304 and it is likely that a trained
judge would hold similar sway over a group of lay jurors.305
The secrecy concerns are also diminished.  Today, juries do not give
reasons for their decisions, and some have suggested that for this rea-
son, the jury’s “claim to be [a] deliberative-democracy institution[ ] is
on shaky ground.306  But the Hybrid Panel would give a reason for its
decision.  It would have to write an opinion explaining why a motion
for summary judgment, or a motion to dismiss, was denied.  Thus,
while judge-jury deliberations would still remain secret (just as single-
judge “deliberations” remain secret), the final product of those deliber-
ations would be revealed.  In addition, public (and litigant) confidence
about jury decision-making is likely to increase by simply knowing
that a professional judge has taken part in the deliberation.
Some might complain that while I spent a great deal of time dis-
cussing judicial bias, I have ignored the fact that jurors are often bi-
ased as well.  They might be biased against deep pocket defendants
300. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT.
REV. 127.
301. AMAR, supra note 186, at 93.
302. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LE-
GAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 33 (1975).
303. Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson and Juries: The Problem of Law, Reason, and Politics
in the New Republic, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 38 (2005).
304. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 729–30 (1992) (discussing the im-
portant role that the jury foreman can play in jury decision-making).
305. Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 243, 295 n.270 (2000) (explaining that juries accord judges “enormous defer-
ence and respect”).
306. Solomon, supra note 182, at 1365.
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such as insurance companies, hospitals, and large corporations.307
They might harbor racial or gender biases.308  There is no question
that one of the reasons the jury lost much of its power is due to its own
biases.
But just as the presence of the jury can help counter judicial bias,
the presence of a judge will help counter jury bias for many of the
same reasons.  Jurors will be forced to deliberate with a professional
judge about the law and could not simply rely on prejudices or biases
in justifying their decision.  Arguments based on race and gender bias
are less likely to be made in the presence of a respected judge.  But
even if the Hybrid Panel reached the “wrong” verdict, its mistakes
would arguably be less harmful.  Every new case would involve a new
set of jurors.  Unlike a judge, who might be biased in favor of a
wealthy contributor in every case involving that contributor, a new
group of jurors would hear the next case involving that contributor.
The Panel’s mistakes would not threaten the right to impartiality (or
democratic virtues) like the biases of a single judge could.
Finally, one important reason for the increased use of pretrial pro-
cedures like summary judgment is that litigation is costly and time
consuming, and summary judgment allows for the resolution of issues
without trial and the expenses associated with it.309  With long
backlogs in most state courts, jury trials require a great deal of time
and resources.  But while the Hybrid Judicial Panel adds additional
expense and time, the Panel is substantially more efficient than a full-
blown jury trial.  Since the judge must already decide the motions
alone, adding a group of jurors to that consideration is unlikely to sig-
nificantly delay the resolution of the motions.  Also, the jury is signifi-
cantly smaller than the typical twelve-person jury we see in the few
civil cases that actually reach trial.310  In addition, the benefits of
countering judicial bias far outweigh the minor additional delay and
expense that might result from the inclusion of lay judges in the pre-
trial litigation process.
V. CONCLUSION
Civil litigation has evolved a great deal since the time of the found-
ing.  Whereas litigation then revolved around the trial, modern civil
307. Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An
Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121 (1996).
308. J.R. POLE, CONTRACT & CONSENT: REPRESENTATION AND THE JURY IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 133 (2010) (discussing history of jury racial bias in civil
rights litigation in the South); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524,
526–27 (1973) (recognizing that racial bias infects jury deliberations).
309. See Miller, supra note 264, at 986 (discussing the “recent outcry” in curbing the
social costs of litigation).
310. See JONAKAIT, supra note 231, at 90 (discussing the benefits of smaller juries).
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litigation is largely about pretrial.  Discovery and motion practice are
at the core of the twenty-first-century civil lawyer’s experience.  But
our conception of the jury has remained static.  The jury appears on
stage only at trial, and these days, the play is long over.  It is time for
the civil jury to evolve.  The jury should play an active role at the most
important stages of modern civil litigation.  My proposal—the Hybrid
Judicial Panel—allows for just that.  It reintroduces the jury into
American civil jurisprudence, and allows the jury to serve the bias-
checking role it was intended to serve.
